


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Soviet Union

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 4, July-August 1989

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[Selected translations from the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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SOCIOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC REFORM

Lines

905D0001A Moscow SOTSIOLICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 89
(signed to press 21 Aug 89) pp 3-12

[Vladimir Olegovich Rukavishnikov is a doctor of philosophical sciences, leading science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. He has appeared repeatedly in our journal]

[Text] Lines, large and small, have long been a characteristic trait of our reality and an inseparable attribute of our way of life. For many years, if not for decades, they literally were not noticed and were considered some sort of given, an unpleasant but inevitable phenomenon which did not merit special study. Only statistics dispassionately recorded the loss of free time because of lines, explaining them by the unsatisfactory organization of services, the shortage of selling floors and the lack of goods. At the same time, the ordinary customer from the presence or absence of lines, from the assortment of goods on the shelves and the accessibility of goods and services judged not only the quality of the trade enterprise operations but also the effectiveness of social policy. Public opinion on the results and the course of perestroika is also being shaped in the lines. Let us give some characteristic statements from questionnaires and letters received by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion under the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the weekly SOBESEDNIK related to research being carried out on the problem of lines and shortages. "...However one talks about the changes, until they have 'sold off' the lines we will be humiliated and insulted or simply deceived" (an anonymous respondent who signed "A Purchaser With Nothing to Purchase"). "Lines are a national disgrace" (Science Associate V.B., Tartu). "Lines are the disgrace of our leaders" (Navigator N.K., Kuybyshev), "...Perestroyka is in its 4th year now, but there is not even a hint of promising trends" (Worker A.R., Kirovograd).

A questionnaire in which the readers were asked to reply to a series of questions showing their personal attitude toward lines and the measures for combating this phenomenon was published in the weekly SOBESEDNIK on 8 September 1988 (No 37). Over a period of 2 months,

more than 7,000 replies were received for the questionnaire (for the sake of comparison let us point out that over the year the editors usually receive around 40,000 letters). In several hundred letters, in addition to the filled-out questionnaires, there were emotional or analytical commentaries, with references to specific facts and observations by the authors of everyday life. Over 70 percent of those replying to the questionnaire gave their names and addresses and expressed readiness to participate further in mail public opinion pollings. A portion of the questionnaires had been filled out after a discussion in a family council or on the job. Questionnaires were sent in which had been copied at the initiative of the readers themselves. Many respondents emphasized that their participation in the questionnaire was caused not only by the interest in the subject of it but also by the hope of influencing the process of decision taking and by a belief in the growing strength of public opinion.

As is known, the editorial mail usually does not provide an opportunity to gain an objective notion of the views of the basic mass of readers. Those who write into the editors are, as a rule, persons who respond sharply to a sense of injustice, to shortcomings and at times those who due to personal reasons do not adequately assess the situation. It has been assumed that primarily persons who are not indifferent to the question have replied to our questionnaire and the results of a press questionnaire may inaccurately reflect the true distribution of opinions. In particular, we expected that the share of negative views would be greater than with the traditional method of questioning. For this reason using the same questionnaire an additional sampling was made of small control groups with different sociodemographic characteristics. In Moscow, in the Moscow suburban town of Lyubertsy and in the town of Cherepovets in Vologda Oblast, we questioned students from VUZes (50 persons), workers at industrial enterprises (100), engineers, technicians and white collar personnel, including physicians, pedagogues and so forth (171), workers in trade and the service sphere (112), students from the senior grades of secondary schools, vocational-technical and technical schools (101). The choice of the control groups was determined by the structure of the reader audience of SOBESEDNIK and by the subject of the questionnaire. A comparison of the distribution of the replies for the control groups and analogous groups in terms of socio-demographic characteristics as isolated in the mass of questionnaires from the readers of SOBESEDNIK did not disclose substantial differences in the proportions and profile of distributions as no shifts were discovered toward a positive or negative area of views and a statistical analysis of the reliability of the difference in the sampling shares according to the student criterion did not show the presence of an influence from the method of obtaining the information on the results.

The replies to the same questionnaire published in the Kursk Oblast youth newspaper MOLODAYA GVARDIYA in November 1988 were sent in by more than 300 residents of the oblast center, the towns and

villages of the oblast. The distributions of the replies from the readers of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA were analogous to the distributions of the replies from the residents of Kursk sent into SOBESEDNIK.

Thus, it is possible, in our view, to assert with confidence that the opinions disclosed on the basis of the press questionnaire for the given problem are valid not only for the active portion of the reader audience but also for broader circles in the nation's urban population.

Below we have given the results of a computer processing of the file containing 5,001 questionnaires, including the data on the questioning of the control groups (the file did not include the questionnaires arriving at SOBESEDNIK after 15 October 1988 as well as the questionnaires of MOLODAYA GVARDIYA which were processed separately).

The structure of the file by sex is: 52.9 percent women and 46.6 percent men (0.5 did not indicate their sex); by age: 9.6 up to 17 years inclusively; 12.7 for 18-20 years; 23.5 for 21-25 years; 18.9 for 26-30 years; 10.7 for 31-35 years; 9.1 for 36-40 years; 7.3 for 41-50 years; 4.3 for 51-60 years; 1.4 percent over 60. Students were 9.2 percent of those

replying, students in institutions of higher learning were 11.9 percent, workers were 19.8 percent, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel were 42.2 percent, servicemen were 4.8 percent, employees of trade and the service sphere were 8.3 percent, pensioners were 2.7 percent and agricultural workers were 0.4 percent.

Table 1: Assessment by Respondents of Situation in Sociodomestic Sphere, % of Persons Replying*

Sector	Lines Grew	Situation Did Not Change
Trade	56.4	39.1
Services	23.0	44.5
Rail and air transport	47.4	36.9
Municipal transport	20.7	56.1
Mail, savings banks and so forth	22.1	50.6
Theaters, movies, museums, clubs, discotheques and so forth	25.9	44.5
Dining rooms, cafes, buffets and so forth	26.1	50.1

* The Table does not show the share of respondents who did not voice a definite opinion.

Table 2: Opinion of Respondents From Different Regions on Lines and Shortages, % of Persons Replying

Region	Lines Increased		Shortages Are In...			
	In Trade	On Transport ³	Everything	Nonfood Items	Food Products	Total ⁴
RSFSR ¹	52.6	46.8	36.8	64.8	21.4	58.2
Including:						
North & northwest	48.4	36.3	34.8	60.8	26.0	60.8
Central	51.7	37.6	39.2	57.5	22.1	61.3
Volga-Vyatka	52.2	43.2	44.6	56.3	16.0	60.6
Central Chernozem	51.7	46.5	41.6	65.6	20.6	62.2
Volga	52.9	52.1	40.1	64.4	21.1	61.2
Northern Caucasus	51.8	51.0	38.7	66.4	18.1	56.8
Urals	62.6	46.3	37.3	68.9	18.6	55.9
Western Siberian	56.6	49.9	44.4	59.3	18.3	62.7
Eastern Siberian	53.0	59.6	36.4	59.9	19.3	55.7
Far Eastern	48.0	48.5	28.0	69.8	23.2	51.2
Kaliningrad Oblast	48.0	44.0	20.0	80.0	32.0	52.0
Ukraine ²	59.4	45.4	39.7	63.3	20.7	60.4
Belorussia	66.9	41.5	33.9	61.9	22.8	56.7
Baltic, including:	57.7	42.2	27.8	68.8	20.2	48.0
Lithuania	66.9	34.1	31.8	61.0	12.2	44.0
Latvia	61.0	45.6	30.9	67.6	22.1	53.0
Estonia	54.8	45.2	30.4	65.1	16.2	46.6
Transcaucasus, including:	51.1	63.3	29.5	58.8	17.7	47.2
Georgia	29.4	64.7	23.5	61.8	17.7	41.2
Azerbaijan	50.0	64.2	30.2	62.3	9.4	39.6
Armenia	73.9	60.9	34.8	52.2	26.1	60.9
Central Asia, including:	51.0	52.7	34.5	60.9	23.8	58.3

Table 2: Opinion of Respondents From Different Regions on Lines and Shortages, % of Persons Replying (Continued)

Region	Lines Increased		Shortages Are In...			Total ⁴
	In Trade	On Transport ³	Everything	Nonfood Items	Food Products	
Uzbekistan	54.8	54.3	39.6	58.6	23.3	62.9
Kirghizia	44.0	44.0	32.0	64.0	16.0	48.0
Tajikistan	63.0	55.6	29.6	63.0	29.6	59.2
Turkmenia	42.1	57.0	36.9	57.9	26.3	63.2
Kazakhstan	55.6	47.6	24.9	65.9	15.1	40.0
Moldavia	64.9	44.6	40.5	51.4	21.7	62.2

¹Including Kaliningrad Oblast which in terms of economic zoning is considered as part of the Baltic Region.

²The economic regions comprising the Ukraine are not given separately.

³Rail and air transport meant here.

⁴The values given in this column have been obtained by adding the values in the columns "Everything" and "Food Products."

DIAGNOSIS

Like any illness of the social organism, a line is a product of the interaction of numerous economic, social and organizational factors which vary depending upon the circumstances, the place and time. For this reason, it is essential first of all to clarify the objective picture of the distribution of the illness, the degree to which the sectors of the nonproduction sphere of the economy and various regions of the nation are afflicted with this malaise.

The data of Tables 1 and 2 provide a notion of the situation in the nation as a whole. Everywhere a majority of the population is concerned not only with not decreasing but in 1985-1988 even increasing lines in stores, in ticket offices, for rail and air transport, as well as in the service and public dining sphere. In the assessments of the dynamics of lines at entertainment facilities, in municipal transport, at post offices and savings banks, there are insignificant regional differences. Thus, the "illness" has an ubiquitous distribution and a total character. Consequently, its etiology, its causes and conditions of occurrence are the same in all regions of the nation.

The USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] explains this as follows: "The shortage of the resources of goods, the unsatisfactory operating hours of the trade and consumer service enterprises lead to lines, to unjustified losses of free and at times working time of the workers to purchase goods and services and to a decline in the level of services. Thus, in a number of places the purchasers spend an average of approximately 1 hour to purchase daily necessities (sugar, meat, sausage and confectionery items, animal and vegetable oils, fruits and vegetables); the figure rises from 1 to 3 hours to purchase individual scarce nonfood commodities (particularly imported ones)."

The data of our questionnaire indicate that by references to "a number of places" and "individual scarce commodities" the Goskomstat somewhat varnishes reality.

"Lines and shortages are Siamese twins; if there is a line it means they have released scarce goods and conversely, if there is no line then there are no goods and one can calmly pass by this section"—similar judgments are encountered on many questionnaires and very accurately characterize the real situation. In actuality, while in the comparatively recent past the notion of a "shortage" was linked to the idea of fashionable imported nonfood commodities which would not be included, as a rule, among the vital necessities, in recent years the content of this notion has substantially broadened and now many cheap articles in mass demand and ordinary food products are spoken about as being in short supply. Over one-third of the respondents categorically asserted that where they lived—and these were all the regions of the USSR without exception (see Table 2)—virtually all commodities are in short supply ("the shortage is everything...everything except bread,...it is easier to say what is not a shortage" and so forth). The less emotional respondents explained that specifically they had in mind their compatriots who said that "everything is in shortage." An example would be the questionnaire from an 8th-grade student in Zheleznogorsk, one of the towns in Kursk Oblast: "Much is in short supply in our area: soap, soap powder, razor blades, sugar, milk, meat and so forth."

A special word must be said about foodstuffs. These were mentioned in 19.5 percent of the questionnaires as a shortage, and here only 3.7 percent indicated generally recognized food delicacies and in all the others they were vital necessities. Clearly for an approximate assessment of the share of the population which is extremely dissatisfied with the supply of foodstuffs, it would be completely correct to add up those who said "everything is in short supply" and those who pointed to specific types of food products (see Table 2).

The validity of this conditional arithmetic operation, it seems to us, would scarcely cause an argument from the reader. The "sugar crisis" and the rationing of meat, fats

and certain other food products in many regions of the nation are the chief arguments in favor of such an approach.

Diverse nonfood commodities are mentioned as being scarce in almost two-thirds of the questionnaires. The undoubted leaders on this list are footwear, clothing, books, cosmetics, perfume articles and these items are indicated in the questionnaires of a majority of those replying, regardless of the type of employment, age, sex and place of residence. Only 3.1 percent of the questionnaires put imported goods as being scarce; the position of the majority was expressed by the formula "we do not even dream about imports, let us be able to get domestic goods."

The commodity hunger evened out the differences in the sex-age groups. A detailed analysis of the unsatisfied demand has disclosed only a certain specific attitude in the youth and young adult groups with the scarce items in the former more often being cassettes, imported and domestic audio and video equipment and among the latter cosmetics, cheap and fashionable clothing, sports goods, condoms, and children's clothing. However, all of this was mentioned, as a rule, in a long list of goods needed by all without distinction as to sex and age.

In the opinion of the respondents, the main reasons for lines are: a) the shortage of high-quality goods and services on the market with 38.9 percent of those replying; b) unsatisfactory planning and a failure to study the demand of the public with 9.0 percent; c) the primitive organization of trade and the low professional skills of the workers in the service sphere ("we do not know how to trade and service," "the trade worker is not interested in the end result of his labor") with 8.3 percent and d) the aggregate of the three indicated factors with 36.3 percent.

The views of the representatives from different socioprofessional and age groups concerning the reasons for lines did not differ substantially (the differences in the percentage distributions for the groups established in the analysis over the entire spectrum of opinions were statistically unreliable). The particular features in the positions of men and women were apparent only in the fact

that women more frequently see the main reason for lines simply in the lack of goods (43.6 percent in comparison with 33.9 percent in the males), while the males are rather inclined to explain the existing situation by an aggregate of economic problems in production and distribution (41.2 percent in comparison with 36.7 percent in the women).

But, public opinion links the presence of lines primarily with the commodity hunger, shortcomings in the production sphere and only then with the rudimentary organization of the distribution system.

One cannot help but mention that a number of letters and questionnaires (their share was around 1 percent of the total number) contained judgments that in our nation the problem of lines could not be solved by socialist development and that this problem like other economic problems had been caused by the unskilled leadership of society by the Communist Party and so forth. Many such letters were signed and their authors were persons of varying age (from a pensioner to a school child) and from different types of employment. Such views in our view are still another argument in favor of the fact that lines are viewed by public opinion not merely as a symptom of economic dissatisfaction but also as an unique indicator for the effective functioning of our sociopolitical system. Here, for example, is a letter from Krasnodar Kray: "...I could not help but respond to the questionnaire because the problem of shortages and lines for me is probably the most painful (if you do not consider the apartment problem). I recently returned from Yugoslavia where I spent an entire month on an official trip. Was it really just a month? All the time that I was there the notion was constantly in my head: But why did this small country which has a number of domestic and external problems happen to escape (possibly this did not exist in the past) from the problem of shortages and lines? The people there feel much freer and calmer because they do not have to spend nervous energy looking for scarce products or time standing in lines. And I became so ashamed for our country, for our people who see one another not as brothers but as rivals. Why can't we somehow overcome this problem? I cannot find the answer."

Table 3: "In Your Opinion, How Many Years Will It Take for Lines to Disappear?", %

Groups of Persons Questioned	Before Year 2000	21st Century	"Not Soon"	"Never"	Did Not Reply
Women	10.5	14.4	29.6	37.0	8.7
Men	12.9	21.8	27.7	29.3	8.3
Respondents age					
To 18 years	15.5	20.3	24.7	32.4	7.1
18-20	13.7	17.7	26.7	34.6	7.3
21-25	12.1	19.5	32.7	27.5	8.1
26-30	8.4	19.8	30.3	33.2	84.4
31-35	11.3	15.0	27.4	38.6	7.8
36-40	10.8	15.5	29.5	33.3	9.9

Table 3: "In Your Opinion, How Many Years Will It Take for Lines to Disappear?", % (Continued)

Groups of Persons Questioned	Before Year 2000	21st Century	"Not Soon"	"Never"	Did Not Reply
41-50	11.7	15.1	21.4	40.4	11.3
51-60	10.3	12.6	28.0	38.3	10.7
60 and over	15.9	13.0	27.5	36.2	7.2
Trade and service workers	9.7	11.8	34.7	32.3	11.6
School students	17.5	18.3	27.0	30.5	6.8
Students in higher institutions	11.6	24.4	28.2	29.1	6.7
Workers	8.8	18.0	31.4	33.8	8.0
Engineers, technicians and white collar personnel	11.1	16.4	26.9	36.6	9.0
Servicemen	18.2	22.3	28.5	22.7	8.3
Average for sampling	11.6	17.8	28.6	33.4	8.6

THE FORECAST

In commencing the research, we assumed that with an universal negative attitude to this phenomenon, there existed nevertheless nuances caused not so much by individual psychological characteristics as by experience in life, by the type of employment, sex, and that these differences could be discovered in analyzing the verbal expression by the respondents of their attitude toward lines and conduct in the rise of conflict situations in trade.

For testing out these hypotheses, the obtained answers were classified with the establishing of the following types: a) a passive negative attitude toward lines ("as toward inevitability" and so forth) with 40.2 percent; b) an actively negative attitude ("I hate," "I try not to get in line" and so forth) with 55.3 percent; c) conformist and neutrals ("I don't like standing in line but I am ready to be in contact with others" and so forth) with 1.2 percent; d) did not reply to the question with 3.3 percent.

It was a surprise for us that the above-established types were represented both among males and among females in strict accord with the proportions characteristic for the questionnaire file as a whole. Here the share of respondents who viewed lines as an inevitable evil (type "A") is a maximum among young persons under the age of 20 (1 out of 2) and minimal in the age group of 31-40 years (1 out of 3). Some 63 percent of the respondents from 31 to 40 years of age belongs in type "B." In all the socioprofessional groups, the share of persons who "do not accept" lines (type "B") and the share who are "tolerant" (type "A") are comparable by amount as follows: among workers per se 55.0 percent and 39.8 percent, among engineers, technicians and white collar personnel 59.5 percent and 36.6 percent, among servicemen 56.6 percent and 39.3 percent, pensioners 55.1 percent and 38.2 percent, students 48.9 percent and 47.1 percent and secondary school students 51.9 percent and 42.7 percent. It was impossible to establish a statistical dependence between the nature of the attitude toward a line (the type) and actual conduct in a conflict situation, the notions of the respondents about the causes of lines,

the measures and prospects for combating them. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the assumptions concerning the determinants of the attitude toward lines as a whole were not confirmed.

There is the moot question of "in how many years, in your opinion, will it take for our lines to disappear?" And this represented a sort of test for the social optimism of our respondents. And, judging from Table 3, one can scarcely say that they optimistically view the prospects and rates of improvement in the socioeconomic situation as for an average only 1 out of 10 assumed that lines could disappear before the year 2000 (here only 4 percent feel that this would occur sooner, in 5-7 years).

One is struck by the uniform pattern to which are subordinated the distributions of the replies from the representatives of various age and professional groups, men and women: 10 percent are optimists, 50 percent are pessimists and 40 percent have not determined their position. This means that in the given instance for an explanation it is impossible to use the traditional socio-demographic variables, that is, the facts established in the course of the questionnaire cannot be interpreted in the categories of group interests stemming from objective differences in the socioeconomic conditions of the life of various groups.

Clearly, a correct explanation can be found using the deprivation concept and in accord with this the development of pessimistic social attitudes and social tension occurs as a result of the increased discrepancy between expectations and the possibilities of satisfying them. The increased deprivation is explained both by the substantial reduction of the field for realizing already-formed needs (unconditional deprivation) and by the fact that with a fixed or even a growing level of expectation, the gap between the latter and its realization increases so that needs grow more rapidly than the opportunity to satisfy them (conditional deprivation). Speaking in favor of the proposed interpretation are both the patterns disclosed as a result of the questionnaire as well as objective statistical facts including the constant and

rapid growth of monetary deposits by the public in savings banks. The latter circumstance is determined by the commodity hunger, by the unsatisfied demand of previous years, by the change in the structure of consumer demand related, in particular, to the maturing of new more educated generations and the formation of the youth subculture.

A PRESCRIPTION

Since lines are a social problem and the reasons of this are rooted in the economy, the treatment of it involves in social awareness primarily an improvement in the economy and perestroyka. However, for now perestroyka in economic relations and the development of the cooperative sphere have led to the "eroding" of the assortment of cheap commodities, to the turning of traditionally gratis services into paid ones and to the increased scarcity of constantly new groups of goods and services. All of this has been reflected in the accelerated rate of inflation and the drop in the standard of living of the population and, as a consequence, in the growing dissatisfaction in the public with the living conditions. For this reason far from all of the measures being undertaken now to combat lines are encountering a positive response and support. This concerns above all the attempts to resolve the problem within the traditional administrative style of thinking by rationing goods by restricted sales at enterprises and institutions and by increasing prices.

At present, as is known, the restricted distribution of goods and food products—the rationing system—is in effect in 8 union republics. In the RSFSR, out of the 72 oblasts, krays and autonomous republics in the autumn of 1988, meat was rationed in 26, fats in 32 and sugar in 53.

The rationing system has supporters (28.8 percent) and opponents (54.1 percent). Let us quote excerpts from letters showing the arguments of the two sides: "...If we had rationing introduced in Buryatia, then certainly there would be fewer lines and fewer troubles everywhere and the people would approve. Just look at 'Searchlight of Perestroyka' and you would find it hard to believe that in some places there is so much food that they even can choose types of meat. But a month or two ago, they threw out some pork in the store but it was awful to take as it was all yellow, old and slimy. I took it but I threw half away afraid that I would poison myself and my children. Where did they get it? This is the sort of life we lead" (a worker from the service sphere, 38 years of age, a mother of three children from Ulan-Ude).

"We should be ashamed in our times to eat by rationing. Is it possible to plan a menu for 30 days with 1 kg of meat?! And sugar! Why should my children be punished for some still operator?!" (33 years of age, a worker from Ulyanovsk). "The introduction of rationing is not a guarantee for the purchasing of high-quality and essential goods and in the store we are told: there is no choice,

take what there is for sale" (V.L. from Belgorod); "rationing in the 71st year of Soviet power is a disgrace" (B.G. from Krasnodar).

The rationing system which should, in the idea of its authors, provide the guaranteed acquisition of essential food products in fact leads to their equalized distribution. Facts show that in the nation there is no standard procedure for employing this measure and each region in essence operates its own system and in some places the products are distributed to the worker and in others to each family member; the standards for allocating the commodities differ even within a single oblast and often are so small that they discredit the very idea of just distribution. For example, in 1988, in the towns of Perm Oblast they sold from 300 to 600 gms of sausage per month per coupon. Having just made their appearance, the coupons themselves became an object of buying and selling, speculation and abuse as there is no strict accounting for them and supervision over their manufacture and issuing is often lacking. Public opinion is unanimous that it is impossible to achieve true justice in distribution with the aid of a rationing system.

The people showed a differing attitude toward the distribution of scarce goods at the enterprises. Approximately an equal number of women both favored and opposed such a measure, respectively 40.7 and 39.9 percent, while over one-half of the men (52.5 percent) was against. The measure is often also viewed as socially unjust as it leads to an encroachment on the rights of the nonworking categories of the population and employees of institutions and organizations with a small number of employed and contributes to a deterioration of the psychological climate and increased conflicts within the labor collectives over mutual complaints in the allocating of scarce goods.

A majority of those questioned (78.7 percent) favored the widening of imports as a measure to combat lines or more accurately the shortage of high-quality goods. Only 10.9 percent recognized that this path for eliminating the commodity hunger is unpromising. "Alas," as was correctly, in our view, pointed out by one of the respondents, "not everything can be bought abroad, and the acuteness of the problem of lines can only be reduced by measures aimed solely against the lines as the problem must be resolved in tandem with revolutionary economic changes" (a student, 23 years of age, Rostov-na-Donu). As a whole, on the given question public opinion differs with the official line of reducing the imports of consumer goods and shifting to broadening the purchases of modern equipment abroad for increasing the output of consumer goods in the future. The people are clearly tired of waiting for future abundance and want to have everything essential on the shelves now.

It is no surprise that public opinion shows a sharply negative attitude toward a possible rise in prices for scarce consumer goods, since in this manner of combating lines it is very probable that a situation will arise

where the shelves will be stuffed with goods, the lines will disappear but there will be few people who can purchase these items. Some 83.7 percent of those questioned was against the given measure (with 4.4 percent in favor and 11.9 percent unable to answer). Here is what Nina Sergeyevna Kozlova from the town of Rasskazovo in Tambov Oblast, a pedagogue with 40 years experience and a member of the CPSU since 1952 writes: "...I don't stand in lines. It is a matter of principle. I live by the principle of 'get by without it!' Yes, it is difficult but I get by with just what I can purchase without waiting in line or (with an urgent necessity) at triple the price on the market. There are no lines in our food stores and hardware stores as there is nothing to buy. I lived through the hunger and I lost relatives in 1933. The year 1936 was without bread. The war years. The years of rebuilding the national economy.... There is little that I have not lived through. Sixty years of hope, expectation and belief in the future—from five-year plan to five-year plan. I am wholeheartedly in favor of perestroika! But I am not in favor of increasing prices for food products and vital necessities!"

In speaking about the "prescriptions for treating" the illness of "lines" which have become established in the public mind, one cannot help but mention the rather widespread attitude linking the combating of lines to the establishing of the principles of social justice and glasnost in the trade sphere. "A great deal could be changed if our authorities, that is, the 'fathers of the city' did not buy their food in special stores, were not treated in their own personal hospitals, did not travel in official vehicles but were like all other mortals...." (I.Ye. 30 years of age, Urgench, Uzbekistan). "I propose putting in line those who have caused it—the responsible workers (from the director of the department store, the worker of the CPSU raykom to the minister) and thereby restore social justice" (A.Sh., 37 years of age, construction worker, Yenakiyevo). Similar and pithier statements undoubtedly reflect definite social attitudes which cannot help but be noticed and considered.

The persons who share such views show skepticism over the discussion which has risen in the mass information media concerning the problem of lines, in rightly assuming that time will show the vitality and effectiveness of the proposed measures. Proceeding from previous experience, one can expect the degeneration of this struggle into the next campaign with "the mass information media making a lot of noise for 6 months and then new urgent problems will move to the forefront, the departments will work out the next 'comprehensive program' and the 'consumer union' will devolve into yet another 'voluntary' association, that is, another place to find jobs for the party functionaries who were left unemployed as a result of the cutback in the personnel" (T.K., 33 years of age, Leningrad).¹

Public opinion is unanimous that an improvement in the organization of trade and better wages for the trade workers could help to shorten lines. However, contrary to the views frequently voiced on the pages of the mass

press, a majority of the public is not inclined to see the presence of lines as the evil will of the trade workers and the result of the selfish interest of the "bureaucrats of enemies of perestroika" (only 2 percent of the respondents adhered to the opposite viewpoint). In the opinion of a majority, the heavy work of the trade and service sphere workers is inadequately valued by society and the given injustice should be eliminated. On this result the questionnaire clearly differed from the widespread opinion that under present-day conditions the wages of the trade workers are merely of symbolic significance, they have completely lost their role as an incentive for highly productive labor and that raising wages will produce nothing.

The trade and service sphere employees in their questionnaires particularly emphasized that increased wages should come about within the process of broadening the independence of the trade enterprises, improving working conditions and modernizing equipment, as well as increasing responsibility and the degree of involvement of the ordinary sales personnel in management, the hiring and placement of personnel. At the same time, a significant portion of the respondents correctly noted that in many instances it would not take any substantial material outlays to shorten the lines but rather it was merely a question of instilling order and increasing the responsibility of the officials and regular trade and service employees.

A CHOICE

The data obtained as a result of the questionnaire do not differ from the views which have formed among a majority of us. The new fact here is primarily in the quantitative expression which raises the intuitively clear ideas to the status of social facts.

In actuality, it has long been customary for us to find it difficult to purchase good footwear. Here our nation annually produces around 800 million pairs of footwear and over 80 million pairs are imported from abroad (for comparison: the United States produces approximately 300 million pairs and the footwear market is stable).

We are aware that with the enormous lines for high-quality goods, the stocks of unsold items are growing in trade. For a comparison, since the start of the 1980s, these have increased by over 80 percent. The inventories of unsold cultural, everyday and household items have risen at a particularly high rate (by 2.5-fold). As a total, as was pointed out in the statement of the USSR Goskomstat "On the Results of USSR Socioeconomic Development in 1988," a billion rubles of unsold and unsaleable items of light industry which do not meet public demand, modern fashion trends as well as obsolete styles and of poor quality have built up. The unmade purchase means a deposit in the savings bank. Over the last 2 years alone, the deposits of the public in the institutions of the USSR Savings Bank have risen by 54.7 billion rubles and at the beginning of 1989 were 197.5 billion rubles, an

astronomical amount which equals approximately one-third the value of the nation's gross national product.

In our view, one of the social contradictions of the perestroyka process has appeared in the structure of public opinion. This is the contradiction between the expectations of the public and the real changes, the practical results of the transformations in the economic and social spheres, between belief in the slogans advanced by the party leadership and a reticence to make the required sacrifices for the sake of happiness in a distant future. Such contradictions were put by G.V. Plekhanov among the contradictions between the course of ideas and the course of things.

No matter how complex are the reasons for the lines and shortages, this problem must be solved in the shortest time. Regardless of the pessimistic attitude of public opinion in terms of the prospects of the disappearance of lines and shortages, still the determining factor in the approach to this problem is the realization that ultimately a solution to the problem will depend solely upon our labor and upon the course of perestroyka. Then we will cease to consider a shortage of those values which one of the Leningrad respondents wrote about in his questionnaire: "Respect for the individual, the right of choice, free time and human contact. Tasty food, comfortable and fashionable clothing and footwear, 'Kinzmaruli,' the Bible with Dore illustrations. Verse collections of Gumilev, Mandelshtam, Galich, Brodsky, Nabokov. Faith. Hope. Love."

Footnote

1. It must be recognized that this forecast in terms of the mass information media turned out to be correct as 6 months later after the questionnaire, the matter of lines began to be encountered significantly less frequently on the pages of newspapers and in the television and radio broadcasts.

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Impact of Cultural Traditions of East on Economic Activity

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[Text] How is perestroyka going on in the Central Asian republics? Can we observe here positive shifts in the social and economic areas? What has changed in the life

of the rural workers, the women and the younger generation? These questions are not merely a tribute to the times. In habitually extolling the successes (actual and seeming) which the peoples of the region have achieved over the years of Soviet power, we have for a long time closed our eyes to many very acute problems.

Let us examine the state of affairs in such a very important sphere as employment. Alas, the disproportion between the available labor resources and the number of jobs has remained as before. Since the proportional amount of rural inhabitants in the total size of the population of the Central Asian republics remains almost two-thirds, this problem to a significant degree concerns the countryside. While in the villages of other regions of the nation almost everywhere there is an acute shortage of manpower, here the shortage is in jobs. Just in Uzbekistan in rural localities, at present there are around 1 million able-bodies inhabitants not employed in the sphere of social production [1]. And although a number of urban enterprises as well as the sovkhozes in newly developed territories do have a personnel shortage, they, of course, are unable to solve the problem.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that year after year evermore numerous generations are gaining working age as over the last 30 years the growth rate of the population in the Central Asian republics has steadily increased. Over the period from 1956 through 1965, the absolute increase here was 3.5 million persons, and in the following 2 decades, respectively, 5.7 and 5.8 million (calculated from [3]). Of the 250,000 Uzbek young men and women who reached working age in 1986, around 150,000 went to work or continued their education while the remainder filled out the ranks of the labor surplus population, or to put it simply, the unemployed [2]. Nothing has changed on this level in 1987.

The data of a sampling conducted in the regions of the densely populated Kashka-Darya Oblast show the low employment level (particularly for women). On the Sovkhoz imeni Frunze, for example, of the 12,500 inhabitants in 1987, 5,200 persons were of working age, including 2,500 women. Among them 52 (!) had a permanent job, around 1,300 were employed seasonally and almost 1,200 women did not work anywhere. An analogous picture is observed in all the other most densely populated areas of Central Asia.

Let us now turn to some data characterizing the state of the agricultural economy. In Uzbekistan over the last 10 years, capital investments into this sector have doubled while the growth rate of output has sharply dropped. Gross social product, in comparison with the 11th Five-Year Plan, has fallen 4.2 billion rubles short, and over 50 percent of the amount is due to agriculture [4, p 214]. Farms chronically operating at a loss occupy one-half of all the arable land, they use one-third of all the capital but produce only 13 percent of the gross product. In 1986-1987, national income in the republic should have increased by 10.7 percent while the actual growth was

only 1.4 percent. If one considers that during this time the population increased by almost 6 percent, then it becomes clear that there was no improvement in the per capita well-being. Moreover, in comparison with the period of stagnation, the economy slipped back [2]. One can only fail to understand how here one rural worker produces only 43 percent of the national average amount of created product, but he is paid 83 percent of the national average wage level [4, pp 214, 300, 431; 5].

The economic crisis, the stagnation phenomena in social life show that the mechanism of inhibition is seriously jeopardizing perestroika.

What forces are holding back the processes of an improvement in political, economic and social life? Why does the system of motives and incentives corresponding to the spirit of perestroika not "work"? In our view, in order to answer these questions, it is essential first of all to understand the complex and rather ambiguous figure of the "new man in the East" who has supposedly stepped across a whole socioeconomic stage. For long years this image has been idealized and has been given only accomplishments in the public mind.

There is no dispute that over the period of Soviet power in the Central Asian republics, enormous social changes have come about. However, many elements of individual and social psychology have changed little or have even remained completely untouched. As is known, the peoples of this region prior to socialism knew only feudal-despotic regimes. Capitalism with its inherent market, commodity-monetary relations had not acquired a real grounding here. The individual was shaped under the impact of feudal social institutions which were aimed at preserving the existing socioeconomic relations. The traditional upbringing was based on a communal psychology where each person recognized himself as only a particle of "we." The community both protected and punished, in a word, it regulated all aspects of life. Such relations which were deeply embedded in Islam saved man in the cruel world of despotic regimes.

During the years of socialist development, much has changed but there was no fundamental transformation of the peasant psychology so closely identified with the community. A peasant who recognized the significance of his own "ego" did not develop. Neither the kolkhozes in their warped form nor the command system of administration contributed to the individualization of the rural inhabitant's personality.

Precisely here are rooted, in our view, the reasons for numerous of today's problems. Economic practice and ideology during the period of stagnation found good grounds in the vestigial phenomena of kinship and communal-feudal relations. The absence of interest in public affairs, the passivity and neglect of the socialist principles of collectivism—all of this, of course, can in

no way be explained solely by shortcomings in educational work. There was a depersonalization of collectivism itself, the authorship of human efforts and actions was ignored and indifference to who did what and how became the norm. The notorious residual principle in the development of the social sphere in essence meant indifference to man and his vital activities. Hence, the so lamentable state of the social infrastructure in the region. Numerous unsolved problems also exist in the area of public health, public education and culture. We are not even mentioning the violating of the very important constitutional right of women to work. Unfortunately, women still do not feel themselves socially important or materially and socially independent. The disenfranchised state impel them to such extreme forms of protest as self-immolation. Some 250 such cases were recorded in Uzbekistan in 1986-1987 [2].

In pointing to the influence of surviving elements of the social psychology of the past, one cannot help but mention the growing interest in the indigenous population of the Central Asian republics for Islam. In addition to other factors, here, in our view, we can see a direct linkage with the neglect so characteristic of the period of stagnation of man, his needs and inner world.

The demands of Islam to unwaveringly obey the teachers, the preaching of a religious and ethnic exclusiveness and the kinship separateness contributed to the forming of standards of conduct convenient for authoritarian leadership. In addition, this did not run contrary to the notions of a portion of the indigenous population since they reflected a psychology of the peasant raised for obedience to the community, the family and the tribe.

It is not possible to oppose the spontaneous spread of religious awareness merely by conversations about the greater role of atheistic education and by cheap maxims. We are convinced that the increased interest in Islam noticed over the last 2 decades for a predominant majority of the people serves as a sort of compensation for the heavy unskilled labor the share of which both in industry and particularly in agriculture is very high, as well as for the undeveloped sphere of culture and leisure. The predominant manual labor which is monotonous, devoid of any creative content and does not contribute to raising social activeness and the monotonous, dull passing of time during free days and evenings—all of this impels a portion of the population to religion.

One other social problem which is based upon surviving elements of the past social psychology involves the attitude of the indigenous population to changing the place of residence or employment. It is generally accepted that the motivating force for a job move is the desire or interest of the worker and that such a move has a rational nature, that is, is based upon the weighing of all the pluses and minuses. Certainly a majority of people is guided precisely by this. At the same time, there exist factors which do not play such a marked role in the other regions of the nation but are decisive in the mechanism of labor mobility in Central Asia and in the effect on this

process. Here man in his actions significantly more often proceeds from the actions and views of the persons around him and follows traditions even if this contradicts his personal interests or personal gain. As special research has shown, not only the peasant community but any modern small group (family, neighbors, friends or labor collective) in various situations are guided by definite patterns of behavior based upon traditional standards. As an example, take the graduates of the rural secondary schools. Seemingly, it would be more rational and attractive for them to move to new development areas (for example, to the Karsha or Dzhizak Steppes) or to cities where industrial enterprises are being built. The opportunities for obtaining interesting and meaningful work and professional growth and the possibility of living separately from one's parents in a new place are significantly greater. Nevertheless, the migration of the youth is very low. This is explained primarily by the fact that in the social milieu surrounding the young men and women (the parents, brothers and sisters, neighbors and friends) the leaving of one's village for the city or for another area is considered a violating of the age-old tradition and for this reason is condemned.

[Beginning of sentence missing in text]...in the spiritual sphere but also in material production, in production relations and more precisely where the problem arises of establishing an improving the organization of the labor collectives. Prior to the revolution in Central Asia, collective forms of activity prevailed and, correspondingly, group incentives predominated in the labor motivation of the indigenous population. The region did not know capitalist relations and here there was no individual division of labor. For this reason a major role was played, and even in the recent past, by the so-called "khashar" or joint labor (it was precisely by a "khashar" that the Great Fergana Canal was dug in 45 days with a length of 249 km as well as many other irrigation installations). The ethics of individual initiative and responsibility were not part of the flesh and blood of the national labor traditions and had not become a part of the culture of the Central Asian peoples. Psychologically, the indigenous population was unprepared for this and the traditional views did not fit into an organization of labor which presupposed such a motivation system. The situation could be changed by cost accounting and by the introduction of diverse forms of a contract. For example, in rural localities, considering the specific features of family and marriage relations, the family contract could become the optimum variation. However, here there are problems. It is a question of a shortage of arable land. The problem is that in the region there is a high load factor on the rural territory developed for economic use. Here there are 250-300 persons per square kilometer (in the other large republic of the nation there are 30-50 persons). What should be done with the families who have not been given the right to a contract?

The shortcomings in the existing management system and its discrepancy with the socioeconomic situation in Central Asia have caused the extremely inefficient use of

the labor potential. This means that here the people knowingly work at far below full capacity and this is not because they do not wish to work but because they are deprived of such an opportunity. The employment of persons with a secondary education in jobs involving manual and unskilled labor has become widespread.

As a result in Uzbekistan, on the one hand, a very numerous and constantly increasing army of unemployed has appeared and, on the other, the degree of fulfilling the plans and achieving the proposed goals has declined sharply. In the economy the drop in the actual growth rate of product output, as a rule, has caused a decline in the plan indicators for the following five-year plan. Thus, in agriculture the planned rates of increase for gross product have declined from 26 percent in the 9th Five-Year Plan to 19 percent in the 11th, while the actual product increase rates have dropped from 16.5 percent to 10.5 percent while the degree of fulfilling the corresponding plan quotas has dropped over the same period from 81 percent to 55 percent (calculated from [4], p 214; 6, p 61). Instead of energetic measures, the planning and management bodies in the republic have merely passively recorded the unfavorable trends. The practice of reducing the annual quotas has become widespread, the imbalance of the plans in terms of resources and constant interruptions in supply have become customary, the "shadow economy" has assumed major proportions and so forth.

In speaking about the lack of an opportunity to be employed in social production, we must particularly emphasize the political aspect of this problem. Certainly, political and social rights in other areas are realized depending upon how the situation stands with a person's right to work. At present, around 30 million inhabitants of Central Asia are unable to fully realize their labor and creative potential [2]. This, without any doubt, is proof of social injustice.

In terms of Central Asia, one can say with certainty that the persons whose rights have been infringed upon in the labor area will not become supporters of perestroika. Moreover, either consciously or unconsciously they will impede it. Of course, we must not blame them for this but rather blame those leaders, who, having assumed the responsibility of managing, are unable to meet their duties. What will become of the people who against their will are not employed in socially useful labor as well as those who in the near future will have to leave employment because of the intensification of production—this question, unfortunately, remains moot. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that, regardless of the social importance of this problem, it has not been the subject of special, including sociological research. In the Central Asian republics there are no scientifically sound social and economic regional programs, primarily because there is no integrated concept of the individual which would reflect the specific conditions of the region. Without such a concept, in our view, it is scarcely possible to have an effective solution to the socioeconomic and technological problems. The social goals

presently being proposed on the spot are oriented at the "average" or abstract person and not at the individual or social groups formed under the conditions of certain social relationships. In the plans and programs for the social and economic development of Central Asia, one cannot help but consider, for example, that age-old traditions hold an important place among the regulators of social conduct and deeply woven into the fabric of these traditions are religion, kinship relations and the patriarchal family acts as the protector of these traditions. The school and other social institutions to a much smaller degree are the regulators of the standards of conduct.

In sharing the proposal of Academician I.T. Frolov to establish a center on the integrated study of the problems of man, we feel it advisable to pose the question of an analogous center in Central Asia and which would be called "Man in the East." We feel that this should bring together the representatives of all the main sciences dealing with man: philosophy, sociology, psychology, law, medicine, pedagogics and so forth and efforts should be directed primarily at working out a concept of the individual considering primarily the regional socio-cultural context.

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DISCUSSIONS

Weapon of Criticism, Criticism of Weapon

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[Yuriy Rafailovich Furmanov is a candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Moscow State Historical Archives Institute. This is the first time he appears in this journal]

[Text] The multiplicity of interests of social principals and the multivariate of social development with a priority of common human values—these notions are becoming more and more strongly a part of our lives. The recognition and thorough analysis of these realities are, in the opinion of the participants of a roundtable of the APN [Academy of Pedagogical Sciences], and the editors of SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, a most important condition for establishing socialist pluralism in practice. In fully supporting such an approach, I would like to focus attention on one problem which has been only mentioned in passing in the discussion. It is a question of pluralism in social sciences. The actual realization of a diversity of interests and particularly a transition to a multivariant model of socioeconomic planning and management are impossible without abandoning dogmatism, scholasticism and oversimplification in the social sciences and without a restructuring of the system of methodological regulators. A transition from the Stalinist apologetic model of social science to an "open" science in no way is to be reduced to a mechanical broadening of the field of research. Once diversity appeared (was permitted), the latter left nothing to be done but to reflect the new reality. It was essential first of all to restructure the relations of science with society and with management. But it was equally important to change its [science's] self-awareness, the so-called metathinking. In the given context, it is essential to understand precisely what are the inner causes of the protracted and active rejection and condemnation of pluralism as a standard for the functioning of science.

IDEOLOGICAL STERILIZATION

Today not only abroad but also in our nation, when the question comes up of social sciences, more and more frequently an attempt is made to examine their status from the viewpoint of the dilemma: "A crisis of Marxism or a crisis of Marxists?" I am convinced that the cause for the situation which has developed in science is not a paradigmatic crisis in the Marxist theory of society but rather a crisis of its application. Loud announcement of the obsolescence of Marxism have no scientific value and have caused it to be doubted by serious Western researchers. In actuality, is it possible to bury the Marxist theory of society on the grounds that certain ideas of Marx are out of date and have lost their timeliness? Is it possible to identify these ideas with Marxism? Obviously on the given question it is essential

to distinguish Marxist teachings and the teachings which refer to Marxism but have lost the ability for a critical view of society and itself. The characteristics of a "crisis" is applicable to the systematized and dogmatized Marxism but not to a Marxism as a heuristic research program the basic principles of which are criticism and change.

More difficult is the question as to what are the reasons for the "crisis of the Marxists" who have been held captive by dogmatic thinking and the consequences of this crisis for society. Although major miscalculations and distortions in social practice cannot be related solely to theory, there is no doubt that they were inspired by some Marxist theorists who under the new conditions were unable to find the correct balance between science and ideology or more precisely those who ended up between them. Anyone who picks up the journal POD ZNAMENEM MARKSIZMA from the end of the 1920s or the beginning of the 1930s will realize that even then Marxist-Leninist social science was overwhelmed by cliquishness and that even then here the phenomenon of Lysenkoism had appeared when the force of argument was replaced by the arguments of force. From precisely that time the arbiter in disputes among scientists became the party bureaucratic apparatus which vetoed any open discussion of the fundamental questions of social life. Beginning with the 1930s, discussions about Marxism as a creative teaching went into decline and the latter began to be interpreted as a certain positive and complete theory which provided answers to any questions and was ready to be employed for practical purposes. From the ideology of the working class, Marxism was turned into a "scientific ideology" and more precisely into the servant of a certain policy being carried out purportedly in the interests of the workers. Scientific Marxist concepts more and more were covered over with a layer of utopianism in the spirit of a "bright future." The principle of party loyalty in social sciences, in literature and in art began to be interpreted as a method for delimiting the "orthodox" and the "sinners."

For the sake of justice, it must be said that the abandoning of an open and creative Marxism and the turning of the latter into a "school" similar to Aristotelianism for Thomism was not the fruit of apostasy or confusion on the part of the theorists themselves. To a significant degree the transformation was brought about by the "statization" of the social institutions, including science. The system which came into being in the 1930s for the relations between politics, ideology and social science marked the appearance of a conservative orthodoxy which was unprecedented in the history of Marxism and the basic principle of this was the assertion that the theory of Marx—Lenin due to its special "immanent properties" can radiate pulses for new social movements. A situation arose which was analogous to the one which was found in

Germany in the 1840s. At that time, the orthodox Neohegelians defended the following view that since, supposedly, the teachings of Hegel provide answers to all

possible questions, there is no need for philosophy to develop further. Almost 100 years later, virtually the same thing was demanded of the intellectuals only now it was a religious veneration of the ideas of Marx and Lenin. The disobedient, those who endeavored in any way to critically approach the heritage of the founding fathers were not merely branded as revisionists but such people were subjected to repression. As a result, the teachings of Marx and Lenin were reduced to a bookish doctrine, it actually lost its revolutionary and critical nature and more and more assumed a bureaucratic-protective nature. A catechistic form of exposition for Marxism-Leninism, simplified in its accessibility and accessible in its simplicity, was officially recognized as the standard of true Marxism and from this the representatives of the thinking intelligentsia should test their works and views. The works of I.V. Stalin became a canonical form of didactic "Marxism-Leninism," and particularly his "Voprosy leninizma" [Questions of Leninism] and "Kratkiy kurs istorii VKP(b)" [Concise Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] which he edited (each work was published at least 240 times during the life of the leader).

The struggle against dissidence carried out under the slogan of combating sectarianism was also waged on the international scene. The historians of science have yet to analyze how valid were the accusations leveled by the Stalinist ideologists against various currents of Marxist thought in the West. In any event, the isolation of Soviet social science from the achievements of international Marxism caused enormous harm to our science.

The mystification of the dialectical method (and Stalin frequently used the expression "the dialectical method says," "the dialectical method teaches" and so forth) was in reality nothing more than its ideologization, that is, the justification of the "wisdom" of a certain policy. Stalin himself perfectly realized that adherence to the dialectical method in no way ensured unanimity of thought and more serious guarantees were required for this. And these were found. In the report at the meeting of the aktiv of the Moscow VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] organization on 13 April 1928, he said: "If our nation is a nation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship is led by a single party, the party of communists which does not share and cannot share power with other parties, then certainly it is clear that we ourselves must disclose and rectify our errors, if we wish to move forward and certainly it must be clear that someone should disclose and correct them more. Is it not clear, comrades, that self-criticism should be one of the most serious forces which drives our development forward" [2]. An unambiguous conclusion stems from what has been stated and that is that it is inadmissible for the mistakes of political leadership to be brought out by persons who are outside the ruling party. The social scientists (and at that time a majority of them was nonparty persons) had merely to approve the actions

of the ruling party which, if it did make mistakes, would disclose them without fail and correct them independently.

The ideologization and politicization of social life meant its elimination from involvement in major policy. At best, scientists were given the role of assistants in realizing the ideas and directives proposed by the party officials. And in those very periods in history when there was a clear discrepancy between the decisions of the political leadership and social realities, the social scientists had to "reconcile" the latter with the dogmas of official ideology. This was achieved, on the one hand, by overlooking negative facts and, on the other, by unrestrained criticism of capitalism. It was basically a simple ploy: our shortcomings were "errors of development," while the failings of the "capitalist encirclement" were brought about by its permanent crisis and putrification.

METHODOLOGICAL GAMES

As they have lost their autonomy, social sciences have also lost their cognitive interest in the actual development of Marxist theory. While on this path there were definite successes (and they indisputably did exist), the latter were achieved in spite of the stalinist monocentric model for the relationship of ideology, policy and social science. Within science itself, the main obstacle for authentic creativity became the carefully cultivated principle of the depersonalization of the activity of the scientists and it was required of them that any result be represented as an element of "collective reason."

Could the criticism of the cult of personality at the 20th Party Congress shatter the Stalinist model of the relationship of policy, ideology and social science? For this it was essential first of all to begin disassembling the administrative-command system and dethrone ideological totalitarianism. At the same time, their spirit continued to predominate within the walls of the ideological institutions and scientific facilities. At the "top" of these institutes stood the Stalinist sentries who did everything to make even a psychological criticism of Stalin's abuses disappear. For the sake of justice, it must be pointed out that during the period of the "thaw" numerous scientists and politicians appeared who realized that the prospects for social development in our country and in the socialist countries were incompatible with adherence to isolationism in international relations and dogmatism in ideology. Western authors began to be translated and published more and social psychology and sociology were restored. A debate began on nonantagonistic contradictions under socialism and after this the concept of conflict, although in a cautious form, began to be included in the armamentarium of social science.

Why did the social scientists make so little use of the time of the "thaw" in order to fundamentally alter the "viewpoint of socialism"? Why was not there the proper constructive response to the repeated appeals by concerned party leaders to have social sciences face life? It was not merely a matter that the Stalinist sentries did not

intend to voluntarily abandon their ideological heights. The incentives for self-development were undermined by the efforts of the protectors within science itself. Its general methodological program did not provide for the opportunity for conflicting approaches to implementing this program to exist within a single ideology and we lacked an anyway developed system of criteria for assessing the obtained results and the prevailing demand on theory as before remained the indefinite "conformity to practice." In a word, in social science a normal healthy pluralism of ideas and approaches was not near at hand. As before, it remained fettered to values dictated from above. Incidentally, the social scientists are gradually beginning to realize that only an historical approach to the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin can be of heuristic value in our times.

A BRIEF COURSE IN PLURALISM

The main obstacle against the establishing of a healthy pluralism in our social science has been not the monism of Marxist theory (strictly speaking, any theory is monistic) but rather the all-encompassing ideologization and politicization of social sciences. The artificiality of such a situation has been recognized more and more profoundly and its absurdity has actually been admitted to even in the "Filosofskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary]: "In confirming the principled unity of scientific knowledge which presupposes a diversity of scientific approaches and democratic methods of discussing and resolving specific problems of cognition and social life, Marxism-Leninism decisively rejects philosophical and political pluralism" [3]. From the quoted sentence it follows that pluralism in science exists "defacto" and at the same time Marxism-Leninism is opposed to shifting this into the area of ideology and policy. But certainly scientific truths must carry a value and political sense particularly when it is a question of social understanding. The main thing is: for the sake of what does Marxism-Leninism reject pluralism in philosophy and in policy? Is it not for the sake of doctrinally declaring itself to be the "sole scientific ideology" and thereby provide "carte blanche" for any policy carried out on its behalf?

To reject pluralism in the sphere of thought, including philosophical and political, means to ignore the need to prove and argue one's viewpoint in a dispute with opponents. This means to ignore what Marx, Engels and Lenin did over their entire lives, although they were decisive opponents of ideological lack of principle or a mixing of principles. The history of Marxism shows that when the Marxists ceased to listen to opponents, they themselves became buried in scholasticism and theoretical errors. History also shows that the monism of Marxist thought understood not as a single identity but rather as unity in diversity not only does not become weaker but is strengthened in a dialogue with non-Marxist schools, for through dialogue and criticism the dialectical materialistic teachings assimilate on their own basis new ideas and concepts, in freeing these from idealism, utopianism and mysticism.

It would be naive to assume that in our social science there was no pluralism (if by the latter one understands the presence of equally completing approaches to various cognitive tasks within the context of a common ideology). This did exist even during the worst years of administrative interference into science. In truth, it was manifested chiefly in distorted forms. It is a question primarily of cliquishness. I would be so bold as to say that at present this illness has even grown worse. Certain social scientists in taking advantage of the situation of democratization and glasnost make up for the posity of their own constructive program by an active search among their colleagues for apologists of stagnation and the authors of erroneous socioeconomic decisions. There is no dispute that the truth, including in the history of science, should be restored. However, in many instances the searches analogous to those mentioned not only are not accompanied by a self-critical view of one's own works but even by an elementary attempt to draw lessons from the past, including theoretical ones, and thereby move the polemics into a positive plane. Furthermore, the implanting of uniformity and conformity of thought into social science in no way has contributed to a strengthening of the monism of Marxist theory but, on the contrary, has at times led to the directly opposite result. The scientists in their desire to go beyond the framework of dogmatic schemes have resorted to a "secret" and eclectic combination of Marxism with positivism, existentialism, phenomenology and other currents in Western philosophy and sociology instead of openly discussing the heuristic opportunities of the corresponding approaches. Finally, there has been a natural scientific pluralism and, in truth, this has appeared timidly and cautiously with a constant eye on the powers that be. Nevertheless, there have been debates on the applicability of natural scientific methods in social studies, and on the periodization of history, with disputes breaking out and dying down between the marketeers and antimarketeers, the discussion of the subject of sociology has been going on for over 2 decades now and so forth.

In considering the acute need to establish authentic glasnost and openness in science the attempts by certain authors to frighten the scholarly community with the bugbear of pluralism appear at least strange. Thus, in the textbook which was published in 1987 for VUZes, the following passage is found: "A struggle of opinions, differences in the approach to resolving urgent problems and a multiplicity of specific forms for involving the workers in managing the social processes and expressing public opinion are recognized to be a healthy phenomenon in a society of real socialism. But all this practice in no way should be designated by the term 'pluralistic,' considering the capturing of it by bourgeois reformist and revisionistic ideologists and respectively by hostile propaganda" [4]. Even more militant are the authors of the book "Ideologicheskii pluralizm: vidimost i sushchnost" [Ideological Pluralism: Appearance and Essence] (Moscow, Mysl, 1987). The reviewer of the work I. Pogrebovykh reasonably points out that for them

"of importance is not the concept but rather the word from which they in no instance will deviate particularly as this has been sanctified by a years-long tradition which developed in the 1940s and 1950s and in accord with which the notion of a growing uniformity as one advances to communism, the disappearance and withering away of diversity was termed to be social science" [5].

THE STEPDAUGHTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

In our view, of all the social sciences sociology has moved the furthest along the path of cognitive pluralism.

It must be emphasized that a cognitive pluralism is organically inherent to sociology. Reliance on a certain ideology and scientific program not only does not exclude but presupposes a constant clash between conceptual provisions and empirical facts and diverse data which at times contradict not only the theory but also one another. In any, to the slightest degree intelligent procedural guide, the designated situation could be found in the section where they spoke of the basis, propounding and verifying of the hypotheses of the research. These were the rudiments, the elementary principles of sociological research which the sociologists did not abandon even in the worst years of stagnation. In skipping ahead, I would also point out that such a pluralism of facts could not be ensured if it was not reinforced in a methodological program. It was expressed primarily in the well-known three-tiered concept of sociology (the general sociological theory—the middle-level theory—empirical research). Such a scheme, in addition to all else, assumed that on each of the levels one or another problem could be examined from a specific viewpoint. In scientific practice a number of examples of this could be found.

At the same time, it must be stated that as a whole pluralism did not gain official recognition in sociology as a normative principle and its existence in a semilegal form did not have any significant impact on the other social sciences. There are several reasons for this. I would point out one of the main ones, in my view. During the period of the thaw it was not possible to undermine the monopoly right of philosophy to theoretical truth. Sociology was assigned the role of the supplier of facts which the experts in historical materialism and the scholarly communists had to generalize. Later under the impact of the needs of practice and ideology, sociology was granted an independent role in working out the methods and procedures of empirical research but the substantive results of such work still had to be checked out against the general sociological theory of Marxism which in fact operated as dogmatized historical materialism. An unique pluralistic model of sociological knowledge arose. It was divided into two parts: "permanent" with the theory and methodology of historical materialism and "variable" with the techniques and procedures of concrete (applied) research. The values, aims, directions and even the conceptual apparatus of sociological research were declared set for the sociologist

and his job was to define the object of research, draw up programs, collect information and generalize this in a suitable form for the theorist or ideologist.

Possibly some sociologists may find that I am exaggerating the situation. Certainly over the last 20 years in Soviet sociology numerous highly professional studies have been made, including theoretically important and the results of these have made a major contribution to the foundation of our social science. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the extended dominance of dogmatized historical materialism in sociology, in claiming to have theoretical truth, entailed substantial losses both for sociology and the other social sciences. The natural cognitive pluralism little by little began to degenerate into mediocre anarchy. The number of empirical studies rose in a geometric progression and the more of these that appeared the louder the voices of sociologists were heard about the impossibility of comparing the results which had descended in an avalanche upon them. On the other hand, such a situation was very much to the liking of competitively inclined representatives of the other social sciences. Here a "scientific" basis in the "results of sociological research" was found for the slightest change in the political line and ideology.

Without lifting responsibility from philosophy, and I consider myself as among the representatives of this, I do feel that the sociologists bear a definite blame for the apologetic tone and temporizing which predominated for long years in our social science.

THE RIGHT TO BE A SCIENCE

At the same time, it is impossible not to see that the establishing and development of socialist pluralism assume a solution to numerous theoretical and practical problems. I will not dwell specially on these as the question has been discussed very thoroughly on the pages of the journal. I would like to give only one consideration which directly concerns the question: "We can at present view theoretical pluralism as a definite pattern in the development of scientific knowledge and its multivariance.... In accepting theoretical socialist pluralism as a way to the truth, there are grounds to feel that such a category has the right to exist" [1, p 7].

Pluralism in social sciences does not come down to the existence of different "viewpoints" the authors of which are often "digging in the same pit." In the cognitive sense, pluralism represents a comparison and competition among research programs within one or several paradigms. It [pluralism] is a organic moment of cognitive activity. The problem is that thought by its nature is a dialogue process (regardless of whether it is the question of an individual or a collective), and its movement forward presupposes a look at each idea as if from the outside and at each argument and counterargument and so forth. For realizing the corresponding demands in science there are special mechanisms such as the criteria of comparability and compatibility and including

validity, reliability, reproducibility, intersubjectivity and so forth. Certainly their application is possible only on a clear ideological basis.

At present, when we stand merely at the sources of socialist pluralism, it is hard to predict what specific forms it will assume. I would attempt to point out certain aspects which are important for the development of social sciences. In the first place, socialist pluralism presupposes greater control than in the West over the institutions of power and law and order by the public, and its constituting presupposes going beyond the limits of the achievements of bourgeois democracy. For this it is essential to carefully consider its experience. Secondly, socialist pluralism has nothing in common with a lack of principle, anarchy or relativism. Thirdly, it is incompatible with the preaching of war, fascism, national chauvinism, amorality or with the right of the strong to suppress the weak. Fourthly, it repudiates and overcomes the practice of group and class selfishness, it affirms the primacy of common human values and assumes that the rectitude and viability of any position are to be proven in an open and honest debate. Fifthly, socialist pluralism is not limited to a recognition of the importance and necessity of a diversity of opinions, ideas and positions, but goes farther, and orients persons of goodwill to seek out points of contact on the most acute vital problems, it challenges us to see not only what divides us but also what brings us together, and is in favor of a constructive dialogue with non-Marxist ideological and social currents.

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APPLIED RESEARCH

Drugs in the Army

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[Boris Fedorovich Kalachev is a teacher at the Moscow Higher Police School of the USSR MVD. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] In our nation a good deal has already been said about the problems related to the spread of drug addiction. But there is also a "blank spot" on this question. It is a question of the army.

The army is part of a society. Each year thousands of young people are inducted into the Armed Forces and among them, alas, are those who have experienced (and at times a good deal of it) in drug abuse; the servicemen are in contact with the local populus of virtually all regions of the nation, including those where everyday drug addiction has become widespread. In a word, it is naive to assume that the army has not been touched by a social illness the scale of which is very great (we have over 150,000 registered drug users and for each known drug user there are 8-10 unknown ones [1]). Incidentally, even 20 years ago, the military physicians endeavored to raise the question of the use of drugs by servicemen [2], however at that time this attempt shattered on the wall of prohibitions.

It must be said that drug abuse in the army is in no way a new phenomenon. We will not concern ourselves with prehistoric times as many legends have already arisen concerning the use of plant-origin drugs as stimulants which raised the combat morale of soldiers. Let us turn to certain documentary evidence from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries. First of all, the spread of drugs in the army was related to the need for an effective anesthesia for wounded on the battlefield. As the well-known Russian psychiatrist V.A. Gilyarovskiy has written: "...the large number of wounds in the war and revolution, and these were very terrible ones, were the reason for the use of morphine and other narcotics..." [3].

In Russia during World War I, around 1.5 million persons were wounded and during the period of the Civil War hundreds of thousands were disabled. Returning home—to the villages and cities—many of these people brought with them an unintended passion for drugs, as they received these in the army to ease their suffering [4, p 98; 105-107]. In peacetime medical narcotic-containing compounds were not available and for this reason consumption was either substances of plant origin such as hashish and opium (more often in rural localities) or (as a rule, in large cities) illegally obtained cocaine [4, p 84].

Worthy of note is the evidence of the psychiatrist V.A. Gorovoy-Shaltan. He relates, in particular, the story of a

party member to whom a comrade proposed narcotics "as a means for overcoming fatigue and reducing the nervous strain caused by the work during the Yudenich Offensive against Petrograd"; of the establishing at the peak of revolutionary events on a naval ship of a "club of morphine users" the members of which held organized "sessions" and collectively secured narcotics; of a food detachment where nine drug addicts had wormed their way in and who were able to win over to the vice a soldier who on the way back was ready "to give up everything to secure morphine"; finally, about the first revolutionary court in 1920 involving a drug addict sailor who was sentenced by the revolutionary tribunal to 2 months in the guardhouse and 3 months in a penalty company where the offender became even more strongly addicted to drugs [5].

Another way for the spread of drug addiction in the army is the contacts between the servicemen and the local population inflicted with everyday drug addiction. Such precedents are rather well described abroad [6], but they are also known in domestic history. The Academician of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, the traveler and researcher S.P. Krasheninnikov described in his monograph how the Cossacks following the example of the Kamchadals and Koryaks began to consume mushrooms which caused hallucinations, that is, possessed a narcotic action [7]. The military medic T.F. Belugin recorded the appearance of "mushroom drug addicts" among soldiers in 1915 [8]. In the Russian Army in Central Asia from the middle of the 19th Century and particularly intensely at the beginning of the 20th Century, drunkenness gradually began to be replaced by drug addiction. The smoking of hashish became most widespread. To a large degree this was aided by the rash hardening of antialcohol measures by the governor general of the Turkestan Kray [9].

As for the spread of drugs among servicemen by the drug mafia, most probably such a criminal practice began to develop in the period of World War I. Precisely then specialists in perplexity complained of unknown sources for the penetration of cocaine to battle positions [10].

In returning to today's situation, we would point out that in the United States, Canada, Spain, Switzerland and other capitalist countries, close attention is being paid to the problem of drug abuse in the army.¹ Anonymous studies have been made among servicemen and the results of these are published in scientific journals [11]. Other methods are also being employed to detect drug users, in particular biological tests of inductees [12]. If one so wishes, any specialist or merely a person interested in the problem can read about what is the proportional amount in the military contingent of persons who have resorted to various narcotic substances and what is the dynamics of the spread of drug addiction. (Incidentally, according to recent data by Swiss scientists, the number of drug users in the Swiss Army has declined from 23.7 to 8.6 percent [13].)

What is the situation in our country? The research under discussion here was conducted with the participation of the author in 1987 by the USSR State Inspectorate of VUZes, the GUUR [Main Political Investigation Directorate] of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee and the UVD [Internal Affairs Directorate] of the Krasnodar Kraiispolkom in Moscow, Kiev and Krasnodar Kray. The aim of the anonymous sampling which covered over 3,000 representatives of different social strata (basically the youth) was to establish a number of questions related to the way of life of the younger generation. However, in the course of processing the empirical material, the military aspect of the drug problem became apparent.

Here are some data. Among the 1,132 male respondents living in Krasnodar Kray, over one-half (53 percent) admitted that they had used drugs to one degree or another. Here 6 percent took the first dose in army service. Among kolkhoz members, 73.1 percent used drugs, including 5.2 percent who did so for the first time in army service; among workers the figures, respectively, were 58.2 and 14.1 percent; VUZ students 59.8 and 6.2 percent; white collar personnel 38.1 and 18.7 percent; students of PTU [vocational-technical school] 42.0 and 14.2 percent. We also questioned persons who had served prison terms (from 25 to 35 years of age) and pensioners (from 50 years and older). Among convicts the share of drug users was 68.7 percent, and 5.9 percent tried them for the first time while serving in the army. Among the older persons, 16.1 percent could be considered as users. It is worthy of note that here there was not a single person who gained the bad habit during military service (that is, in the 1940s and 1950s).

Let us analyze the disclosed picture. In knowing the upper and lower age limits for the representatives of all categories of persons questioned, it is not difficult to determine the approximate period they underwent regular service. If we compare these data with those given above, it turns out that the least number of those who "became acquainted" with drugs in the army was in the mid-1980s and the largest number at the beginning of the current decade and in the 1970s. However, this in no way means that there has been a drop in the importance of the problem. In my opinion, there has been a "saturating" of the contingent of servicemen in regular service with drug users. Many inductees acquire the corresponding experience while still in civilian life. According to our estimates based upon extrapolating the results of the research, not only in Krasnodar Kray but also in Moscow and Kiev, approximately 5 million persons from among the student youth have tried drugs at least once, and around 500,000 use them regularly. This social disaster has assumed particular scope in those regions where large areas are planted with narcotic-containing plants (wild or cultivated). Thus, 70 percent of those questioned from 14 to 18 years of age and who resided in one of the villages of Krasnodar Kray where hemp is cultivated admitted that they used hashish.

The figures concerning the PTU students also require no commentary. It is essential to consider that the questionnaire covered demobilized military personnel, basically soldiers who were admitted to the PTU in the aim of obtaining the specialty of junior ship personnel for overseas voyages. Thus, the designated problem is urgent not only for the land but also the naval forces of our country.

The group of elderly persons merits particular attention. On the one hand, characteristically among them none began their "acquaintance" with drugs in the army, that is, in the 1940s and 1950s. On the other, a "familiarization" with narcotics in old age is no less serious a problem requiring independent investigation. For example, in the United States an object of special study is the elderly who abuse medicines and as a result frequently fall into a psychophysical dependence on them [14].

As for those who will undergo military service in the near future (that is, the students of schools and technical schools), proceeding from the state of affairs in "civilian life," with a sufficient degree of probability it is possible to estimate the possible nuances of "army" drug addiction. If the current situation is not changed, in a year or 2, the recruits from the Kuban village will begin instructing their Moscow compatriots in manufacturing compounds from poppy and hemp, and they, in turn, will share their experience in employing chemical inhalants and pills. At present, as our research shows, around 70 percent of the fellows questioned from Krasnodar Kray and approximately 16 percent of the Moscow school children are very "successful"—as yet each separately—in "their specialization."

In the course of the research the respondents were asked what drug was most accessible to a serviceman in regular service. Judging from the replies of students in several Kiev VUZes who had recently been demobilized from the ranks of the Soviet Army, this was hashish. This was pointed out by 69.2 percent of the respondents who served on the territory of our nation and by 55.6 percent of the former servicemen in the limited Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan. There is the opinion that supposedly hashish and other substances obtained from Indian hemp are harmless, however specialists are well aware that in the predominant majority of instances they lead to the taking of stronger, so-called heavy drugs, the opiates and psychodelics. One is struck by the following alarming fact. In contrast to those who served in the USSR, the former Afghan veterans stated the accessibility of heroine (22.2 percent) and LSD (11.1 percent). Heroine is among the most dangerous narcotics. In the Soviet Union, it is virtually not encountered while in Afghanistan both the local production of this and other opiates as well as their smuggling are widespread [15]. Here also there are ancient traditions of domestic drug use (Academician N.I. Vavilov who traveled through Afghanistan in the 1920s wrote: "The population has a physically exhausted appearance and this is exacerbated by the smoking of opium" [16]).

What led to the taking of drugs? The main reasons probably are the same as in civilian life: in 59.7 percent of the cases it was curiosity; in 28.9 percent the desire to imitate others, while 3.8 percent of the respondents mentioned stress situations. An equal number admitted that they were initiated by comrades. Among the former Afghan veterans, stress as a reason for resorting to drugs was mentioned by more respondents than in the group of individuals serving in the Union. This evidently explains the more frequent use of drugs under the conditions of serving in Afghanistan.

As a rule, drugs were acquired from acquaintances (65.3 percent), and in 7.7 percent of the cases for money. Some 5.8 percent of the servicemen made their own drugs and an equal number secured them from unknown persons (23.1 percent of the respondents did not answer the question). Thus, illegal circulation of drugs undoubtedly exists in the troops. This is also seen from the materials of the USSR Supreme Court as the military tribunals did not disclose 78 percent of the sources for the penetration of drugs into the army [17].

In addition, the appearance of drugs among the servicemen in the limited Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan was undoubtedly influenced by the unpreparedness of our military for contact with the local inhabitants, an ignorance of the traditions, customs and so forth [18]. Incidentally, specialists warned long ago about the lethal consequences of such ethnographic illiteracy of the soldiers and officers (see, for example, [19]).

In combating drug addiction in the army, a substantial role should be played by military sociology.² This discipline should, in my view, investigate all the phenomena of internal troop life, the conditions and patterns of their development and serve as a "bridge" in studying the social processes occurring in society and the army. A component part of military sociology is military criminology. The textbooks on this area of knowledge unfortunately give no space to analyzing the reasons and circumstances for crimes committed in the troops and involving drugs. Clearly here one can feel the same faulty principle of presenting the appearances that the phenomenon does not exist and hence there is nothing to fight against.

Very important is a correct antidrug propaganda campaign among the servicemen which takes into account the specific features of army life and begins with lectures and ends with posters, training films and videos. And here, as in any other area of combating drug addiction, we must have coordinated efforts and the mutual aid of all involved parties.³

The problem of bringing the "military" legislation into conformity with the national also merits serious attention. The time has come to incorporate in the Disciplinary Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces punitive measures for the illegal consumption of narcotics, and for servicemen of all ranks. It is essential to develop a

mechanism for administrative jurisdiction in instances when it is a question of insignificant amounts of narcotics or their voluntary surrender. These provisions, incidentally, involve the law enforcement bodies. Very important is the question of who will be concerned with supervising the situation in the army from the viewpoint of the state of the drug problem. We feel that co-workers from the military procurator's office and the political bodies could fully assume not only this duty but also the organizing of cooperation between the troop subunits and other state institutions and public organizations. For example, it is extremely essential to have the participation of the military in measures devoted to various problems of drug addiction. As of now representatives from the Armed Forces cannot be found there.

Lastly, the experience of foreign countries indicates that the army can make a substantial contribution to combating drug abuse. Thus, in Mexico, over the last 5 years, the troops have destroyed enormous fields of opium poppy and this prevented the production of approximately 250 tons of heroine as well as hemp fields from which it would be possible to produce over 40,000 tons of marijuana. Troop subunits participate in operations to confiscate processed drugs and to neutralize the drug dealers. As was pointed out by the Mexican Minister of National Defense J.A. Gardoqui, "these soldiers have saved millions of people from the destructive social scourge of dependence upon drugs, from death and corruption accompanying the trade of poisonous drugs" [21].

The Soviet Army should remain a school for indoctrinating courage, civil duty and patriotism. Glasnost in terms of the most acute problems, including those involving the spread of drug addiction, and a scientific approach to solving them are the guarantee for the army to successfully carry out its high mission.

Footnotes

1. Many authors emphasize the particular danger of the spread of drug addiction among those handling nuclear weapons as well as at enterprises involved in the use of nuclear power [22].

2. In the present editions of the "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], the concept of "military sociology" is missing. There is merely mention of the establishing of a military department within the Soviet Sociological Association (on volunteer principles) (see [20]).

3. This happens far from always in practice. Thus, in August 1987, in Krasnodar, a group of military filmmakers who were making a film on drug addiction in the army turned to police co-workers for consultation but were refused.

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Criminal Passion

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[Text] Regardless of the harsh punishments which are handed out for rape, the number of these crimes against the individual, considered by the legislation as amongst the most severe, has not only not declined but has been growing. While in 1987, the statistics recorded a figure of 16,765, in the following year it was already 17,658 [1]. Here it is essential to consider the high latency of the mentioned type of crime. The concealment of the fact of violence (and even an attempt) by the victim is a very frequent phenomenon, particularly in those regions where traditions strictly prescribe that women keep secret any encroachment on their sexual integrity. As legal specialists assume, for each case considered in the statistics there are from 2.6 (the data of G. Reznik) to 4 uncounted ones (data of G. Minkovskiy). Thus, a rape occurs in our country on an average of not every 30

minutes, as has been recorded by the official documents (see [2]) but much more frequently.

In addition to the quantitative indicators, concern has also been caused by certain qualitative shifts in the sociodemographic composition of the rapists and their victims, and in particular, by the "growing youthfulness" of the contingent of criminals. (In skipping ahead, we would point out that this trend has also been confirmed by the results of our research with almost one-third of the persons who have served a sentence for rape being juveniles.) There is one other alarming fact that the proportion of group rapes as before is high (according to the data of A.G. Kalman in 1986, this reached 63.4 percent [6]). In the legislation these are qualified as the most socially dangerous.

At present, there is scarcely anyone who would dispute the need to involve sociologists in a study and prevention of antisocial phenomena. However, as far as we know, in our nation up to now no sociological research has been carried out on the designated phenomenon. Of course, the legal experts concerned with this problem cannot help but touch upon various social aspects. Nevertheless, in our view, this is not enough. There must be a more profound sociological analysis of all the circumstances of the crime, including the behavior of the victim, the personality features of the rapist, the conditions of his life, the family situation and so forth. Such information will make it possible to disclose the risk group and increase the effectiveness of preventive measures aimed at preventing this type of crime.

In research conducted by us in two corrective labor colonies under strict and intensified conditions (1987, Kazakhstan), along with studying the criminal cases of persons serving sentences for rape, we also conducted a questionnaire and individual conversations. A total of 190 persons was questioned and 176 questionnaires were considered fit for processing. The information assembled concerned not only the respondents directly but also made it possible to gain a certain notion of the victim. The need for an interview in which we investigated the circumstances and motives of the crime was dictated by the following considerations. In the first place, a comparison of the answers with official documents provided an opportunity to analyze the reasons for the distorting of information (approximately one-third of the respondents described the situation of the crime not as it had been set out in the excerpt from the court ruling). Secondly, we were hoping that individual aspects of what had happened would become clearer and certain details previously overlooked would "surface." Finally and thirdly, it was assumed that the person being questioned would assess his conduct and its consequences.

The situation for participating in the investigation as a whole was favorable as some even offered supplements to the questioner. A categorical refusal was recorded in 3 percent of the cases. One other preliminary comment. Since the questioning was carried out in corrective labor colonies located in Kazakhstan, among the respondents

was a predominance of convicts who committed the crime in this or neighboring republics.

THE CRIMINAL

In the aggregate of those investigated, basically two age categories were represented: from 14 to 20 years of age (40 percent) and from 20 to 29 years of age (45 percent). Some 11 percent was made up of individuals 30-34 years of age and 4 percent from 35 to 50 years. There was the surprising fact that almost one-half of the adult rapists had a family and one out of every three had children. Some 10 percent of the convicts were divorced while they were in the corrective labor colony.

A predominant majority of the respondents prior to imprisonment was engaged in socially useful activity and just about 45 percent did not work and did not study. The period of time spent holding the last job was very short: from a year to 3 years.

Particular attention must be given to the following circumstance: 62 percent of those questioned replied that they had been commended for production successes. The number of those who had disciplinary measures (comments, reprimands) and administrative penalties (fines, arrest) applied to them was small: 8 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

Certain rapists did have a "record" behind them. At the same time, upon the admission of the persons questioned themselves, although they had previously committed crimes (hooliganism, theft, robbery and the intentional causing of bodily harm), they were, however, not promptly held responsible.

Some 75 percent of the respondents had been raised in a complete family and the remainder either by a single parent (more often the mother) or by relatives, acquaintances and in a boarding school. One out of every four pointed out that relations with the mother and father had been "so-so" or even poor and stressful, that the parents paid little attention to him and he was left on his own. Prior to committing the crime, 73 percent of those questioned had lived in the parental home, 14 percent in a separate apartment, 8 percent in a dormitory and 5 percent on the "dole."

As is known from the results of sociological research, in large cities the crime rate among migrants is higher than among indigenous inhabitants. However, in studying the designated contingent, it was discovered that of the 6 percent of those questioned who had lived over 10 years in one place, 40 percent were representatives of the large cities such as the republic capitals and oblast centers. A similar number lived in worker settlements and in rural

localities. Incidentally, it is not to be excluded that the given figures reflect the detection rate of the crimes and not the actual picture.

Let us examine certain particular features in the awareness and value concepts of the rapist. It is worthy of note that over one-half of those questioned shared the opinion that "often there are exceptional circumstances when it is possible to forgive a man who has struck a woman." In our view, here one can feel such deep-seated reasons for violence committed against a woman as disrespect and a consumer attitude toward her.

The supposition that the reason for rape can be neuropsychic illnesses and related features of sexual intensity was not confirmed: only in one convict was pedophilia established, in two there were psychopathy and oligophrenia and in one we discovered a neurotic disturbance of digraphia.

As the most significant human values, those questioned mentioned a happy family life, respect of others, good health, interesting job and good friends. There were relatively few (18 percent) of those who seek only amusement and satisfaction and are dominated by the idea of material well-being and a concern for material things. It is not difficult to note that the most preferred values were those which were violated by those questioned themselves. This again confirms the inability of persons with deviant conduct to foresee the consequences of their actions and this, per se, is a crime-causing factor. In the views of specialists, precisely the ability to dream and plan the future serves as one of the main indications distinguishing a "normal" juvenile from a lawbreaker of the same age [3]. The inability to reflect about oneself, about tomorrow, in particular, was expressed in the fact that a majority of those questioned were unable to answer the questions "What do you dream about? What would you like to do with your life?"

Our of the entire aggregate of those questioned, we must particularly mention a group of juveniles (50 persons). Primarily prevailing in it were persons condemned for group rape.

While for the entire total of persons questioned, the share of the latter is 44 percent, here it is 92 percent. It is worthy of note that around one-half of the convicted juveniles did not consider their actions to be violent, referring to the desire of the victim to participate in sexual games and they expressed surprise when she turned up at the police. Judging from the materials of the interview, characteristic of virtually all the juvenile rapists is an uncriticalness of thought, the inability to consider the consequences of their actions, expressed cruelty and increased emotional excitability. Moreover, one is struck by the significant discrepancies between the answers of the respondents from this group in the course of the interview and the statement of the circumstances of the crime in the file of the convict.

Among the investigated juveniles, 53 percent came from urban surroundings and 47 percent were residents of the

countryside. One out of every three had been raised in an incomplete family (in particular, they lived with the grandmother or other relatives) and had poor relations with teachers and contemporaries. In the words of one out of two, they did not want to study in school because they did not like it. Some 12 percent of the fellows had previous criminal records or were registered with the inspectorate for juvenile affairs, and 20 percent were unemployed and not studying, that is, they were on their own.

One out of three out of the entire group of respondents had committed a crime at the age of 14-17 years. At the moment of the questioning, a majority of them was from 20 to 24 years. In other words, a rather long term was set for the committed actions. A more detailed analysis makes it possible to conclude that the basic incentive motive for the crime was an early formed need to satisfy sexual attraction combined with immature moral values.

Of the particular features which marked the group of juveniles from the remaining convicts (in particular, young persons 20-24 years of age), we would note the following: the juvenile rapists frequently accompanied their actions with physical outrages and insulting of the victim and more often explained their participation in the crime out of cowardice, lack of character and the fear by refusal to damage their "authority" in the eyes of their comrades. More rarely they complained of a court error and explained their incarceration by revenge or slander on the part of the victim. The more illiterate in legal terms often did not even suspect that they were committing a criminally punishable action.

A circumstance which aggravated guilt and at the same time was one of the reasons for the crime was alcoholic intoxication. Some 60 percent of the juveniles raped their victim being "under the influence," while 17 percent on the day of the crime took the first drink in their lives. To a certain degree the conduct of the victims must also be considered a provocative aspect as among them a significant portion of persons (20 percent) had consumed alcohol along with the rapist. Duress committed by juveniles in an intoxicated state is at times combined with group sex.

A majority of the questioned young men had begun their sexual life early and many had disorderly, completely unlimited sexual contacts (promiscuity). In a number of instances, homosexual acts and sadistic actions were recorded. According to the data of psychiatrists, an early start to sexual life is caused by expressed hypersexuality without stable affections [4]. Let us give a rather typical example from the life of one of our respondents. A juvenile 15 years of age, having experience in sexual life, became acquainted with a young girl of the same age. Their relations immediately assumed an intimate nature. Several days after meeting, he drove her into a forest on a motorcycle and here 10 of his friends were waiting. The respondent asserted that the girl had consented to sexual relations with several of his friends and her complaint to the court some time later after the event

was a complete surprise for him. The official documents state the application of physical and mental pressure on the victim.

In a portion of the juveniles, a state similar to psychopathology can be observed and here the leading place is held by the pathology of attractions which, in particular, is manifested in increased sexuality. Among the juvenile lawbreakers who underwent a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, one out of every five had a poor understanding of social standards and limitations and did not fully realize the consequences of his actions.

Of interest are the replies from the respondents to the question on the reason for committing the action for which they were held criminally liable. As it turned out, a majority did not experience a feeling of guilt. They referred to unsuccessful circumstances and to the fact that they were in a state of alcoholic intoxication (considering this justification) and did not know anything about criminal liability. Many, as has already been pointed out, motivated their conduct by timidity, weak character and a desire "not to lag behind others." Over 50 percent of the respondents were convinced that the fact of violence was totally absent.

To the question of their favorite pastimes in free time, the juveniles most often mentioned sports, music, movies and watching television. According to recent data of sociologists and lawyers, a gravitation toward sports among juveniles is exaggerated. The problem is that they often have weakened volitional impulses and such juveniles are incapable of engaging seriously in sports in special sections. The spiritual vacuum in which the young men are leads to unmotivated mischief and cruelty. Inherent to many of our respondents was inadequate perception and they lacked the habits of self-control.

The lack of meaningful contact and tense relations with parents drive the juveniles out onto the street, befriending others like themselves. Sexual freedom without internal responsibility with unfavorable social conditions, in particular, the high level of alcohol consumption in the immediate social circle, lead to dissipation and from here it is just a single step to crime.

There is the rather wide-held opinion that an increased number of cultural facilities is capable of reducing the crime rate, particularly among the youth. In our view, such a measure will not fundamentally alter the situation. Let us recall that among our respondents, the share of inhabitants from the large cities and rural localities was the same, some 40 percent. Clearly conditions for cultured leisure differed for them, however this did not influence what happened. We feel that here an unsatisfied need for self-assertion plays an important role. The given circumstance is ordinarily overlooked by researchers who view the reason for rapes in the sexual drives of men. Here they overlook the fact that a predominant majority of men satisfies their sexual needs in no way criminal forms. It is worthy of note that only

8.5 percent of our respondents pointed to sexual attraction as a reason for the crime while 10 percent of the adult rapists, considering themselves impotent tried thereby to assert themselves.

In our view, of great importance in preventing such illegal actions is the inner culture of a person and this is manifested, in particular, in the ability to establish contact and have normal relations.

THE VICTIM

In analyzing rapes, it is essential to consider the behavior of the victim and this is important both for assessing the circumstances leading to the crime as well as for working out concrete preventive, precautionary measures. The victims of such crimes usually are those who for various reasons are unable to resist the criminals (youth, physically weak, excessively obedient and weak-willed) as well as those who provoke an assault by a male by their flippant, uncircumspect conduct and by elements of sexual "games" in contact with representatives of the opposite sex. According to our data, 27.8 percent of those convicted of rape viewed the behavior of the victim as provoking sexual closeness while 44.8 percent felt that all of this happened "by mutual consent."

Without claiming any irrefutability of judgment, we consider it possible, proceeding from an analysis of the interview data and the official documents, to suppose that the victims often behaved extremely recklessly: they drank alcoholic beverages with unknown males, they obediently followed them to a deserted area and did not show reasonable circumspection. Here is a typical situation: a group of young men proposed giving a ride to a young girl in their car and she agreed, although it was late; in an evening at a bus stop several young men buy a girl a bus ticket, thereby strike up an acquaintance and later force her to get out at a deserted stop.

Generally speaking, a predominant majority of rapes occurred in the evening and at night, and here twice as often in the spring and summer as in the winter. One-third of the crimes was committed in an apartment (one's own, relatives or the victim's). Very frequently such cases occurred in the wilderness as well as in city parks and squares and almost 25 percent of the cases involved a motor vehicle with the offer for a lift, to be taken home and so forth. Often the vehicle served as the place of the crime.

Of the other circumstances involved in rape, let us mention the following. While persons over the age of 20 usually planned their actions, the rapes committed by groups of juveniles, as a rule, were the result of spontaneous, situational actions such as a joint outing, drinking, an inclination for sexual closeness and only then physical violence. Some 70 percent of such situations was accompanied by intense physical and mental coercion (the causing of bodily injury, the threat of murder or the indulging in perverted sexual acts), in 10 percent firearms and cold steel, metal chain or the threat of a dog were employed; four rapes ended tragically with

the murder of the victim; in one a young girl took part (she held the victim by the arms). As was learned in a conversation with one of the workers from the law enforcement bodies, the latter case was not so terribly exceptional. Around 2 percent of the rapes occurred in the presence of women who actively assisted in the crime.

But let us return to the rape victim. The particular significance of her victim conduct has been emphasized in the special literature. It is a question of certain personal traits which combined with external factors in certain situations provoke a crime [5]. The victim often behaves in such a manner that the criminal begins to believe he would not be punished for what he committed. One out of seven of those with whom we spoke, in his words, was confident that the victim was a "girl of easy virtue" who was experienced in "sexual games" and for this reason "nothing would happen to him."

The materials of the research make it possible to isolate several groups of victims depending upon the degree of activeness of their victim conduct.¹ In the first are those who at the moment of the committing of violence against them were in a state of alcoholic inebriation (17 percent of the entire contingent of persons questioned mentioned this circumstance as the main reason for the committed action; one out of five juveniles pointed out that his "partner" was in an intoxicated state). Many of the future victims had been invited to a restaurant, cafe and so forth, where they drank alcohol in the general company. (Let us point out that 53 percent of the victims were not acquainted with the rapist and for the remainder the degree of acquaintance varied: from "we had seen one another before but did not know each other personally" to "we were in school together.") In the course of the interview, a curious detail came out: rather frequently the consent of the girl to go to a cafe or restaurant (and particularly when she allowed herself to be paid for) was seen as an indisputable proof that she realized how all this was to end and was not against such an outcome. A second group was made up of victims who were characterized by lack of discretion in acquaintances, flippancy and often dissipation in contact with men. They were easy to meet, they were not against going to an unknown place, in a word, also to a certain degree by their conduct provoked violence. Incidentally, the same applies to victims of different ages. Some 42 percent of the respondents accused the woman of what happened in giving the following arguments: "She herself consented and then later suddenly turned to the court," "obvious resistance was absent," "she did not flee although there was an opportunity" and so forth.

A separate group is made up of girls who as a consequence of incorrect sexual upbringing (or the absence of such) set out on the path of prostitution. They do not know how to behave with sexual harassment, they

cannot defend themselves against encroachments of constantly changing partners and frequently become the victims of asocial groups of juveniles or adults.

Finally, a fourth group is made up of those who incorrectly interpret attention by a male, who are not familiar with a certain type of male sexual conduct and is not aware that a criminogenic situation is developing which is fraught with violence.

The intensity of the victim's resistance depends upon the situation of the crime, personality features, emotional state, experience in life and the physical development of the victim [6]. With the rape of a juvenile, of importance are not only her physical weakness but also ignorance of the methods of defense and the comparatively rapid loss of the ability to resist [7]. At the same time, according to our data, in all instances when the victims put up the most decisive resistance to the violation, this not only did not prevent the crime but exacerbated its consequences. The same conclusion has been reached by the West German sociologists W. Kieff and S. Lamnek [8]. Below we show the table compiled by these scientists and from which it can be seen that there are no grounds to speak about various actions by the victim which could have prevented the crime. The reason for an unsuccessful violation is most often not the woman's resistance but rather the awkward actions of the criminal [ibid., p 87].

Conduct of Victims in Situations of Rape and Robbery, % of Those Replying

Actions of Victims	Rape	Robbery
Have called for help	42	58
Swore	18	15
Defended themselves	42	36
Tried to dissuade criminal	70	24
Tried to outsmart criminal	21	6
Tried to flee	33	12
Asked for pity	27	9
Froze with fear	24	24
Abandoned resistance	33	9

W. Kieff and S. Lamnek have dispelled a number of myths in the public mind related to the problem of rape. One of these is "it is possible to prevent the violence if you correctly defend yourself." Here one overlooks the fact that a man is stronger than the woman and he also employs methods of mental and physical effect. Another myth that "a decent woman is not threatened with rape" or "a self-possessed, well brought-up woman is not involved with unworthy men and for this reason is not in danger." The authors also do not agree that in a rape a woman supposedly can experience satisfaction as this is carried out contrary to her desires and involves threat and humiliation. Of interest is the position of the West German sociologists on the victim's conduct. According

to their data, the victims in all instances behaved in a manner that would be unjust to accuse them of provocative conduct.

In concluding the discussion of the question concerning the "rapist—victim" relationship, we would like to bring up one other aspect. Among the prisoners studied by us, one out of five adults and one out of nine juveniles stated that they were told that they would be the object of revenge by the victim's relatives and so forth. Several persons, in their words, had been slandered by women who had entered an intimate relation with them in order to achieve selfish aims. In instances when a large amount of money demanded by the woman for sexual cohabitation was not paid, the victim turned to the court with a case of rape.

Some 8 percent of those questioned explained their complete, in their opinion, innocence and the absence of a committed crime by the fact that "she" did not immediately go to court but only did so several days, weeks, or even months later. Here it is essential to bear in mind that the experiences of the victims (particularly juveniles) depend largely upon their emotional stability and the position of parents, neighbors and acquaintances. For this reason, the turning to the law enforcement bodies far from always happens immediately after the incident.

At the same time, we cannot exclude false accusations of an attempt at rape. In certain girls increased sexuality is manifested in an inclination for precisely such fantasies. The image of herself as a rape victim involves the desire to be at the center of attention and to make a sensation in her peer group. Insufficient competence in the forensic medical expert examination in such instances can lead (and, unfortunately, often does lead) to court errors.

CONSEQUENCES

Fear, pain, shock and turmoil—all of this inevitably is experienced by virtually each victim. A majority of the victims did not rid themselves of the shame and humiliation subsequently when they had to reply to tactless questions, here accusations of incorrect conduct, give testimony in the process of the court investigation and so forth. According to the data of the Soviet investigator A.G. Kalman, instances are known when the publicizing of information on the committed crime drove the victim to a suicide attempt. Some 25 percent of the victims after the court review of a criminal case changed their place of residence and 30 percent left their former employment (predominantly these were unmarried girls [6]).

In addition, many show extended depressions, apathy, various phobias and for a long time they maintain aggression, mistrust of persons around them, a loss of self-respect and a sensation of "sulliedness."

The West German researcher Kron has pointed out that virtually all the rape victims questioned by him a year later after the event complained of trouble sleeping,

headaches, depressions and a feeling of guilt would not leave them. In a majority, sexual problems arose and 60 percent of the victims began to leave the house more rarely, and minimized contact with friends and acquaintances [8].

We have already spoken about the provocative role of victim conduct. However, an equal danger is to be found, however paradoxical this may seem, in a fear of possible rape and which is instilled in girls by their parents as the rudiments of sex education. And it is not merely a matter that fear is not the best weapon in situations which threaten the individual's inviolability. Impotence, a lack of self-confidence and mistrust of persons around, caution in everything—these are the costs of such an upbringing.

In the West, various social organizations play a major role in rehabilitating those who have become rape victims. In West Germany this is, for example, "Help for Raped Women" which is financed exclusively by contributions and member dues. The aim of the organization is to provide emotional support, advice as well as educational work on the mass information media as well as shape public opinion on rapes as a social problem. The women who turn for help here are additionally aided by the fact that here they can speak with others who have lived through the same misfortune and those who will not condemn them but understand. We feel that similar organizations could function completely in our conditions as well, all the more as we have already gained experience in establishing various psychological services, telephone hotlines and so forth. As for preventive work, here we must say first of all what actually lies on the surface. We have in mind the need to improve the moral education of the younger generation, including sex education, and not only the medical but also the social aspects. This should be based upon the idea of the independent value of the existence of each person and his physical inviolability.

It is also essential, in using the mass information media, to raise the level of the public's knowledge about the legal consequences of sexually-based crimes and about typical situations when such crimes are most probable. The preventive propaganda should be addressed both to men and to women.

Furthermore, in considering that the unsatisfied need for self-assertion plays a special role amongst the reasons for any type of violence, it is extremely important to organize the leisure of juveniles and the youth and here shift the accent toward their own independence.

Along with this, it is essential (with the aid of sociological research and in the process of law enforcement, pedagogical and medical practice) to ascertain the "high risk" groups. With the representatives of them it is essential to conduct individual work using special procedures and the development of these is a common undertaking for lawyers, psychologists, sexual pathologists and pedagogues. In this context, it seems extremely

beneficial to us to organize special courses with the task of teaching meaningful communication and interaction. As of now, such measures for some reason are focused on adults with money and not on those who have a greater need for this, that is, the very young members of our society who are entering the world without any preparation whatsoever for the actual problems of human intercourse.

The very first and very difficult task which must be carried out in line with what we have described is to find the forms of collaboration between the practical workers, scientists and the law enforcement bodies as well as give some thought to the possibility of coordination within the system of social preventive work.

Footnote

1. Of course, one must not think that violence befalls exclusively those whose conduct could be described as victim. A surprise attack, the threat of physical violence, the helpless state of the victim and other similar situations without any provocative conduct by the victim whatsoever are very widespread.

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FACTS, COMMENTARIES, NOTES

Individual Artisan on the Rizhskiy Market

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[Text] The survey the results of which are discussed here was conducted in 1988 by one of the research groups from the Moscow Higher Police School. Around 70 artisans were interviewed at Moscow's Rizhskiy Market, the center for trade in individually produced goods. The data obtained, of course, do not claim to be representative, however they can make up for the acute shortage of empirical information on the development of the "minor economy."

The very response of the individual producers (basically they are tailors) to attempts to discuss urgent questions for them was unexpected. A third of the potential respondents refused to talk. Some 60 percent of those questioned, having replied to the questions, did not want to give their names. This desire for anonymity was willingly commented on by the individual workers themselves. For some purely business circumstances were crucial: any noncommercial questions meant a loss of time and the artisans must value time. According to their own assessments, they spent from one-quarter to one-third of the aggregate working time in sales (delivery to the market), standing in lines in stores which will take articles on a commission basis, organizing the trade area at the market and the sales itself). A good number of respondents saw in each "lounger" who asked questions about supply, marketing, and income as a potential enemy—so fresh were still the wounds from contact with the bureaucrats on the executive committee commissions on individual labor activity, the finance inspectors, the workers of the law enforcement bodies and so forth.

The lamentable state of material-technical supply in the "minor economy" provides extremely little grounds for frankness. The corresponding normative documents, chiefly the departmental legal enactments (for example, the Letter of the USSR Ministry of Trade of 20 February 1987 and the procedure envisaged by the Decree of the USSR Gosnab [State Supply Committee] of 10 March 1987) do not provide the individual producers with any guarantees as to a more or less stable receipt of raw products, materials, semifabrics, fuel and equipment. Incidentally, the answers obtained, even very frank ones, surpassed the most pessimistic forecasts. Some 40 percent of those replying stated that they obtained materials by bribing the trade and material-technical workers or from speculators. Another 10 percent admitted that they obtained textiles, finishings and so forth due to personal acquaintance with trade workers. Further studies

revealed that such contacts are based in no way on a personal mutual sympathy or sincere selfless friendship. The reciprocal service is, as a rule, payment for the goods or information about their availability. Thus, one out of every two artisans uses illegal or unofficial channels for supply.

The spread of "shadow" economic relations in the sphere of individual labor activity is also aided by the elementary legal ignorance of the artisans. A large portion of them simply has no idea as to their rights concerning material and technical supply. Thus, for 70 percent of those questioned, it was a complete revelation to learn that they could insist on the acquisition of raw products, materials and equipment through territorial bodies. Curiously, not one of the artisans, even among those who had heard about these instructions, had used the mentioned right. For a majority of the individual workers, the time-consuming procedure of petitioning and securing raw materials from a supply organization seems (quite validly, we would point out) excessively overbureaucratic. Another, smaller group of individual producers considers it ill-advised to get rid of already developed illegal contacts as there is less red tape and this is more reliable from the standpoint of results. Finally, around 80 percent of those questioned did not have the slightest notion of the possibility of leasing equipment for individual labor activities.

Virtually all the individual producers who employed the services of the speculators and bribe-takers to obtain the essentials for producing the goods, described these ties as extremely undesirable in legal terms (a fear of administrative and criminal liability) and, at the same time, "in no way not burdensome" and even "completely normal" in economic or, more accurately, commercial terms. The latter circumstance should not cause surprise as their average monthly earning, even when not free of the speculative "tax," is over 500 rubles.

This paradox leads one to the conclusion of the need to legalize a portion of the operations involved with individual middleman commerce. If the social and economic danger of the activities of the state trade workers who, due to their official position, possess information and scarce holdings and actually trade in them, in our view, is an obvious one, then the existence of independent individual middlemen is completely justified from the economic viewpoint. Their functions often come down to discovering above-norm stocks of raw products, materials and equipment at enterprise warehouses and delivering them to the artisans. Here actually is the same individual labor activity in the sphere of exchange. At present, this is described as speculation (or middleman commerce) and can be prosecuted under criminal law. The decriminalization of such activities, like the social recognition of the individual producers engaged solely in trade (the activities of trade-purchasing cooperatives are permitted) would correspond completely to a policy of liberalizing the criminal legislation.

One of the tasks of the survey was to attempt to determine the adequacy of the earnings of the artisans to the labor expenditures particularly as their income turned out, according to the results of the survey, to be double the amount of the cooperative members.¹ But here it is important to consider the aggregate time expenditures and these are very significant. Some four-fifths of those questioned combined individual labor with work at a state enterprise (the remainder were pensioners, disabled persons and housewives). In addition to the 8 hours of their main job, they spent another 2 or 3 hours in "secondary employment" and the total length of their workday is 10-11 hours. As an average, the selling of articles consumes about an hour daily. Moreover, 50 percent of those questioned employ the aid of relatives living with them in the process of production and marketing.

The problem of so-called outside labor in the process of individual labor activity clearly requires a separate study. It is important to know how valid is the provision provided in the current legislation in accord with which no limit is put on the number of jointly living relatives who have the right to engage in individual labor activity under one license and there is also the acute problem of settling intrafamily "production" conflicts. Around 30 percent of the questioned artisans admitted that family members took a negative attitude toward their endeavors (from "cautious" to "openly negative"). Among the reasons for this were the reduced free time in the family, noise in the apartment, a kitchen employed as a shop and, unfortunately, simply prejudice. Certain mail individual producers stated directly that their wives "tolerated the private workers at home" only because of the income brought in.

One of the working hypotheses of the research was the idea that due to the wishes of the legislator, unjustified economic legal differences had arisen in the status of the two main principals of the "minor economy"—the cooperative members and the individual producers.

Linked to this, in particular, was the question concerning the motives which forces the respondents to purchase a license for the right to engage in individual labor and not join a cooperative. Approximately 60 percent of those questioned used in their reply such words as "easier," "simpler" and "more peaceful." In a word, they preferred individual labor because the "artisan not in a cooperative is the head." Many (50 percent) would like to join a cooperative in the future. For now, they are "timid" or cannot find associates who share the same idea and with whom they could collaborate.

Around 20 percent of those questioned stated that they feared the bureaucratization of the cooperatives and it must be admitted that these fears are not devoid of justification. We encountered an interesting phenomenon which showed that the economic boundaries between cooperative and individual labor are fluid and at times illusory. Certain artisans work in associations but under the procedures of individual labor activity.

There are artels each member of which has his own license; the permission to engage in individual labor here serves as a guarantee for production stability as in the event of a major conflict, the artisan virtually painlessly can continue the job outside the walls of the association. Here arbitrariness by the "professional cooperative leaders" is not excluded. At the same time, in such artels of individual workers there is the real socialization of the means of production. They exchange the implements of labor which belong to them with the rights of personal property; elements of the division of labor appear and money is used jointly (the renting of space, transport to deliver to the market and so forth).

There is a very broad spread of opinions in the view by the artisans of the most odious manifestations of social injustice in the sphere of individual labor activity. A large portion (90 percent) links these to the rudimentary nature of material-technical supply and the product sales mechanisms which preserve the inequality between the state sector and the "minor economy." Thus, 40 percent of the respondents considered the number-one problem to be precisely the systematizing of trade: 26 percent urged "rapid construction of a covered market" and 14 percent "enlarging the trade floor." One out of four considered the actual lack of information services (advertising, economic consultations, eliminating legal ignorance and so forth) to be the "greatest disorder" in this area.

Thus, there are still numerous difficulties on the development path of individual labor activity the social value of which is indisputable. Their elimination is a necessary undertaking.

Footnote

1. According to the data of the Scientific Research Economics Institute under the USSR Gosplan and the Scientific Research Institute for Labor, the average monthly earnings of a cooperative member involved in the production of goods and services is 250-260 rubles.

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